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The writer examines and critiques the cognitive-developmental

theory of moral growth with a view to translating it into

a

theory of

The moral development approaches of Piaget and

spiritual development.

Kohlberg are examined in detail and are found to be theoretically
elegant but biased in their almost exclusive reliance on the cognitive

domain to explain moral behavior.

It is suggested that moral theorists

might fruitfully look at the findings of depth psychologists such as
Carl Jung and Erick Neumann whose investigations of the unconscious

offer an affective complement to Piaget and Kohlberg'

s

cognitive

moral
orientation particularly in explaining discrepancies between

thinking and behavior.
and
Spirituality is defined as the domain of ultimate meaning

they attempt to
value as perceived by individuals and around which

orient their lives.

The writer suggests that there are spiritual
iv

V

stages parallel to Kohlberg’s moral stages whereby individuals
define
the meaning of their intuitive spiritual experiences in personal
and

social terms.

The lack of spiritual stage development has probably

caused many sublime spiritual experiences to be translated into

repressive social correlates.

Finally the writer examines several different moral education
endeavors including his own, most of which have

a

cognitive develop-

mental or humanistic orientation, and outlines a teacher-training

program designed to educate teachers adept at facilitating both moral
and spiritual development.
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INTRODUCTION
The following paper is written from the philosophical

perspective which considers education to be a special kind of

human interaction, which, however structured, has as its goal
human growth and development.

In recent years Piaget and Kohl berg

have proposed psychological theories of cognitive and moral

development which have stimulated an increasingly large body of
research.

Their theories have also inspired educators to apply

their developmental insights to the educational process.

In the

realm of moral education, which is one of the principal foci of
this paper, a wide variety of curricula, designed from the develop-

mental viewpoint, are becoming available.

Curriculum research and

design has, in turn, led to an examination of the atmosphere of the
school in which the curriculum is taught.

Kohlberg (1972) is of the

opinion that this atmosphere exercises an overriding influence on
the developmental progress of students.

The structures that define

administrative, teacher and student roles, relationships and attitudes
can powerfully reinforce the developmental orientation of a given

curriculum or virtually cancel it out.
continues to
And so the purview of developmental education

broaden.

newer areas
New findings suggest further questions and still

to research.

the
The first purpose of this paper is to examine

(Chapter II) and
research into the psychology of moral development
1
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some of the educational applications stimulated by it (Chapter IV) in
an open-ended and sometimes critical way.

It is open-ended because

I suspect that developmental psychology is just getting its legs under

itself and that educators have scarcely begun to explore its relevance
to their own discipline.

It is critical because of a tendency in the cognitive-develop-

mental approach of Kohlberg to pass over important contributions of
other psychological schools to the understanding of the developing

moral agent.

Kohlberg'

s

theory, which focuses on the cognitive aspects

of moral judgment, has a theoretical elegance about it that is hard to

resist.

Emotional and other non-rational motivating factors, on the

other hand, tend to be opaque, resistant to human understanding in both

practice and theory.

The temptation, therefore, is to work with clear

and distinct conceptualizations rather than with the amorphous and

indistinct realm of the non-rational which escapes easy categorization.
I think the cognitive developmental school in general tends to fall

prey to this temptation and that this is reflected in curricula
inspired by them.
own ventures into moral curriculum development have included
the uses of techniques derived from Gestalt Therapy and other humansnd
istic psychologies to enable learners to tap the more intuitive

ground of
affective aspects of their personality which constitute the

their moral thinking and action (Chapter IV).
however, I have utilized Kohlberg'

s

At the same time,

stage theory as an organizing

the exchange of mutually
framework lest moral dialogue degenerate into

irreconcilable opinions.

3

The second purpose of this paper is to use research into moral

development as a point of departure to speculate about possible
developmental features in the religious or spiritual realm.

Kohlberg

has raised the issue himself (Kohlberg, 1971, 1973) in his speculations

about a meta-ethical stage 7, as has the theologian Fowler (1973)

working in concert with Kohlberg.

Kohlberg suggests that in the

experience of meaninglessness and despair brought on by confronting the

reality of death, rational moral codes and commitments crumble.

When

the fundamental meaning of life is questioned, so inevitably is a

morality based on reason alone.

In terms reminiscent of Gestalt

psychology, Kohlberg sees the solution to such a dilemma in an experi-

ential shift from figure to ground.

At such a moment (often but not

always during a mystical or peak experience) our ego-perspective
(figure) is replaced by a cosmic perspective (ground)

We perceive

.

and value life from the cosmic or infinite perspective rather than

from our customary, finite viewpoint.

Supposedly we experience meaning

at a deeper (or higher, Stage 7, level) which, in turn validates our

commitment to purposive and moral action.

Whatever the validity of Kohlberg'

s

philosophic speculations,

his comments raise the issue of whether one can integrate often highly
into
subjective and essentially incommunicable intuitive experiences

universal, developmental framework.

a

It also raises the questions of

world relate
how does one's basic meaning and value orientation in the
to one's moral stance.

issues in
I attempt to deal with some of these

Chapter III.
of
Finally, I propose the tentative outlines

a

curriculum for

4

teachers (Chapter V) in which I attempt to integrate the cognitive-

developmental approach to moral education with other psychologies more
oriented to affective and unconscious motivations.

In addition there

are modules which raise some of the philosophic issues considered in

Chapter III concerning meaning and morality.

The orientation of the

curriculum is to encourage students to trust and use their own experience.

Exercises are designed to broaden their awareness and cognitive

constructs to assist them to organize their experience into meaningful
patterns.

CHAPTER

I

BACKGROUND

Moral education in some form or other has been part of the

human enterprise from the very beginning.

As long as people have

associated together in groups, certain norms have governed their

relationships with each other and the world and this, in turn, has
necessitated teaching these norms to new members of the group.

Naturally what was taught and how has varied as greatly as the many
forms of society which have evolved all over the planet.

Although the teaching of morality has been a conscious undertaking of humankind for many centuries, it has only recently become
self conscious preoccupation.

a

With the greater differentiation of

human consciousness and the development of more and more specialties
and competencies of knowledge, educators have turned increasingly not

only to philosophers, theologians and religious authorities for guidance but also to psychologists and sociologists.

The increased social

scientific emphasis has focused attention more on the process of moral

education and less on what was to be taught.

The distinction between

the process of moral education and its content is relatively recent
but crucial to understanding the current state of the art.

Process

pays attention to how the learner learns both with regard to what
organizes
happens within (intra-psychically) as he or she receives and

5
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information, and what happens without in the learning environment,

that is how social and ecological conditions, teaching strategies,
techniques, etc., facilitate or hinder moral growth.

The content of

moral education are the attitudes, values and moral judgments which
a learner assimilates or develops.

While these are commonly

expressed as axioms or commandments, e.g.,
to receive,'

1

it is better to give than

'thou shalt not kill,' they are not always so easily

articulated nor immediately applicable to a given situation.

For

example, an increased respect for human life or a greater sensitivity
and responsiveness to inequities in the social system need not be

reducible to concise adages but nevertheless represent genuine moral
growth.

There are nearly as many differences of opinion concerning
the process of moral education as there are about what ought to be

taught.

Several attempts have been made to arrange the various

approaches schematically.

Kohlberg (1964) categorizes the literature

he reviewed according to the importance researchers give to behavior,

emotions, or moral judgment, respectively.

Later, however, he and

Mayer (1972) suggest that general educational approaches, including
moral education can be categorized according to three underlying psychological and philosophic positions: 1) the romantic position

represented by Freud, Gesell and A. S. Neill's Summerhill

;

2)

cul-

tradition of
tural transmission derived from the classic academic

Western education, and

3)

progressivism , represented by Dewey, and

as the cognitivemore recently modified by Piaget and Kohlberg himself

developmental approach.

y
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According to Kohl berg and Mayer, adherents of the romantic

approach view human development through the metaphor of organic
growth.

Mental development unfolds according to prepatterned, geneti-

cally determined stages.

The environment provides little more than

nourishment for that growth.

Emotional and moral development also

evolve through hereditary stages, such as the Freudian psychosexual
stages, but remain independent of cognitive development.

depends on knowledge of the social world; the former is

The latter
a

biological

given which, unless frustrated and fixated by the environment, unfolds
of its own accord.
The cultural transmission model views the development of the

mind through the metaphor of the machine.

The environment imprints

relatively unprocessed input or data directly on the mind where they
are accumulated and elicited by an appropriate stimulus or emitted

under appropriate stimulus conditions.

Learning is defined in terms

of specific responses or behaviors which can be shaped by reward,

praise or feedback.

Educational systems as apparently disparate as

the United States and Soviet public schools and the Catholic parochial

schools (at least those uninfluenced by the Church reforms begun in the

mid-1960»s) rely heavily on the cultural transmission model.

This

model seems especially congenial to the educational techniques derived
from behaviorism and social learning theory.
The progressive or cognitive developmental metaphor is not

material but dialectical.

It is analagous to a conversation or dia-

opinions with
logue which consists in the confrontation of ideas and
the opposites.

transThe consequent interaction (or as some prefer,

8

action) stimulates cognitive, moral, and affective development, for

these three realms are parallel aspects of a unified structural reor-

ganization that occurs in development.

(As we shall see, the cognitive

developmentalists better exemplify this structural unity in theory
than in their concrete applications.)

Referring back to Kohlberg'

s

(1964) earlier categorization of

education approaches, Kohlberg and Mayer assert that the cultural

transmission viewpoint emphasizes behavior

,

the romantic viewpoint

inner states and feelings and the progressive point of view coordi-

nates the two.

Again I note in passing that in fact the cognitive

developmental viewpoint, at least as represented by Kohlberg and his
colleagues, in actual practice emphasizes cognitive and judgmental
skills and deals with the behavioral and affective aspects of moral

education only tangentially.
Hoffman (1970) in an extensive (99-page) review of moral

education literature, organizes his material according to a tripartite
schema somewhat different from either Kohlberg or Kohlberg and Mayer.

He asserts that there are three philosophical doctrines which bear on
both theorists' and practitioners' approaches to moral education:
"

original sin " doctrine, the

"

innate purity " doctrine, and the

"

the

tabula

rasa " (blank slate) doctrine.
In psychological circles

— the

original sin advocates stress

the importance of early intervention by adults to protect children

from their own anarchic tendencies and to socialize them.

The moral

and
education process is identified with teaching children to adhere to

ultimately to internalize the norms laid down by society.

The most

s
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characteristic modern representative of this approach in the psychoanalytic tradition is epitomized in Bruno Bettelheim who says:

"one

can live successfully and learn well in school as long as one's

growing up begins with a very firm and stringent morality based on

fear and trembling" (cited in Stewart, 1974, pp 165-166).
Hoffman's second category, derived from the doctrine of innate

purity

,

resembles Kohlberg and Mayer's romantic classification and

both ascribe it (probably wrongfully) to Jean Jacques Rousseau.

Sur-

prisingly, Hoffman classifies Piaget (and by implication Kohlberg) as
the main present day representative of the innate purity approach'.

According to Hoffman, adherents of this approach believe that adult
and societal influences should be kept to a minimum during a child

formative years because they are primarily corrupting.

'

It is true

that during his early work on moral development Piaget (1965) believed
that young children, who experience adult rules as alien and heteronoraous,

could best develop morally through interaction with their peers

only (a point on which he and Kohlberg differ)

.

His increasing empha-

sis on the importance of the development of role-taking perspectives,

however, implies an intense social participation at variance with

a

concern for the "corrupting influences of society" characteristic of
the innate purity doctrine.

Hoffman's third category is founded on the tabula rasa doctrine

which views the human psyche as an infinitely malleable blank.

In this

and
it resembles Kohlberg and Mayer's cultural transmission category

both articles assign the learning theorists to this group.

Hoffman,

shares the
himself a learning theorist, notes that this third category

10

psychoanalyst's concern that without early adult intervention the
child's primary motivation would continue to be the gratification of
biological drives.
In terms of moral motivation Hoffman asserts that Piaget

locates it in conscious prior .judgments of rightness or wrongness;

Freudian theory in largely unconscious attempts to repress powerful
irrational forces; and learning theory in responses to extrinsic

rewards and punishments with little or no accompanying rationale.

Here again he notes an overlap among more recent learning theorists
who consider such internal motivation as altruism and consideration
for others.

A more recent attempt at organizing and making some sense out
of the mass of philosophic speculation and research data concerning

moral education is that of John Stewart (1973, 1974).

He lists four

approaches to moral education.
1.

Traditional-Authoritarian Approach (Absolute Nomothetic)

.

This approach views values as absolute givens which are externally

objective and embodied or reflected in the traditions of society.

The

human person is viewed either as a blank slate (tabula rasa) or
inclined toward depravity.

In either case people require guidance and

their values need to be formed or inculcated

try

knowledgeable guardians

of tradition of the Truth (scientific, secular or religious.)

External

and is obtained by
or behavioral conformity is of paramount importance
a

congenial to this
set of psychological education techniques most

eliciting disapproach derive from behaviorism with its emphasis on
crete, observable responses.

11

Cultural Relativistic (Relative Nomothetic )

2.

.

The propo-

nents of this approach, according to Stewart, believe that values ere
absolutes for a given society but relative across societies.

Values

are defined by and objectively exist in a given culture but it does

not follow from this the same values would have equal validity in

another society.

Like the traditional authoritative approach, the

human person is viewed either as a blank slate or inclined toward
In both cases the process of socialization is considered

depravity.

of primary importance and this is accomplished more on the level of

feeling and emotions than on either the cognitive or behavioral
levels.

The development of interpersonal relationships, role modeling,

and conformity to peer expectations are effective means of advancing
the socialization process.

Psychoanalytic techniques, adjustment

counseling and social learning theory strategies can be used singly or
in combination to aid the process the motivating force of which is

primarily guilt or anxiety about meeting or failing to meet the standards of society.
3

.

Absolute Relativistic Approach (Idiographic )

In reaction

.

to morality,
to the structures of the two above mentioned approaches

a

values to be of
more recent viewpoint has developed which considers all

each individual from
equal validity uniquely determined as they are by

his or her own conscience.

Values are a subjec tive matter and there-

values if the latter has
fore no one may legitimately judge another's
feelings on
truly consulted his or her own thoughts and
The human personality enjoys

a

a

given matter.

fundamental goodness which, if heeded,

and good decisions.
will unfailingly incline it to make right

This

12

viewpoint is founded on some of the tenents of existential and humanistic philosophies, especially insofar as they emphasize the uniqueness
of the individual, the holism of the person and the basic drive toward

self-actualization.
The educational techniques of values clarification, sensitivity

training and even some indoctrination, e.g., about the basic goodness
of human nature or one's feelings, are used in this approach.

It is

unclear, however, how individual self-actualization is integrated into

community purposes and goals.
4.

Organismic Structural Development Approach (Universal

Transactional )

.

Like both Hoffman and Kohl berg, Stewart

saves what he considers the most adequate moral -philosophical position
(his own) to the last.

Drawing heavily on Piaget and Kohlberg he

defines values as neither strictly subjective nor objective but sees
them as the outcome of a transaction between the developing organism
and its environment.

Ultimately those values have universal applica-

bility because they are based on fundamental biosocial determinants

which are structurally verified everywhere.

Regarding the innate

goodness or depravity of human nature, this approach maintains

a

neu-

tral stance although it recognizes a basic dynamism that inclines the

human personality both toward a more holistic integration within itself
and a more adequate and universal value system.

The organismic structural approach is naturally congenial to
the cognitive developmental educational strategies which include demo-

cratic involvement, developmental parenting, the induction of disequi-

librium and some values clarification techniques.

13

Summary

At this point the reader may be somewhat confused by the

variety of overlapping categories set forth by the authors in their
attempts to simplify matters

1

In an attempt to sum up I will simply

mention that initially Kohlberg divided moral education theory
according to whether it focused primarily on behavior
moral .judgment .

Later he and Mayer elaborated

a

,

emotion or

more complex schema

but never fully relinquished this basic approach.

Their cultural

transmission category resembles the earlier behavior category although
it is more elaborate.

The same can be said for a comparison between

the emotion category and the later romantic position

;

and obviously

between the moral .judgment category and the progressive or cognitive

developmental viewpoint .

Stewart provides an even more elaborate

schema but moves in the same direction.

His distinctions appear even

more carefully thought out and also provide some sense of the historical movement of moral education.

His distinction between the tradi -

tional authoritarian and cultural relativistic approaches is useful
in values
in that it demonstrates what they have in common, a belief

as objective things, as well as where they differ:

(a)

absolutizes values, the latter sees them as relative to

the former
a

given society;

behavioral techniques, the
and (b) the former leans more heavily toward

latter toward the psychoanalytic.

Otherwise his absolute relativisti c

and Mayer's definition
approach appears virtually identical to Kohlberg

structural developmenta l
of the romantic position and his organismic
position.
approach closely resembles their progressive

"original sin,
Hoffman's division of the literature into

14

"innate purity" and "tabula rasa" positions is somewhat misleading if
his readers assume that these are systematic philosophic positions.

He

seems, instead, to use these terms as a convenient way to organize the

extensive amount of research which he has reviewed.

Nevertheless each of his three positions gets at a part of the

truth about human nature and none should be ignored.

As we shall see in

the following chapter, there is an anomic element in human nature,

resembling Hoffman's "original sin" category, that resists all efforts
to tame it.

There is also an innately creative and spiritual element,

similar to his "innate purity," which tends to lift us up above ourselves.

The "blank slate" category seems most appropriately applied to

human cognitive and social functions which have little in the line of
instinct to guide them.

It is only when one of these positions is

preferred to all the others that a sectarian narrow-mindedness begins
to intrude itself.

The virtue of the cognitive developmental position, which we

consider in some detail in the following chapter , is that it attempts
to synthesize the several positions outlined above which, at first

glance, seem to be irreconcilable.

It values the influence of the

environment without falling prey to environmental determinism.

It

into
appreciates the dynamic quality of the human mind without falling

corsolipsism or opposing the goodness of the human spirit to the

rupting influence of the environment.

Less successfully, perhaps, it

unified schemata
attempts to integrate thought, feeling and action into
separate compartment.
or structures without relegating each to a
and cognitive
But even synthetic theories have their biases

.

15

developmental ism is no exception.

As we shall see, despite claims to

the contrary, it continues to focus rather narrowly on cognitive func-

tions of the person.

Unconscious, affective, imaginative, intuitive,

spiritual faculties do not receive equal billing, except for the claim
that they too fit somehow into comprehensive mental structures.

Despite its obvious inadequacies, it remains, in my opinion
the single most provocative psychological moral theory to date.

It

asserts that morality is a distinctively human enterprise of enormous

complexity which cannot be compared with functions of sub-human
species.

It has attempted to integrate the cognitive, affective and

social aspects of human existence into a universal set of schemata

which remove from morality the passionate, sectarian overtones which
associin recent times have caused the very expression "moral" to be

ated with narrow-minded obscurantism.

And finally it has provoked a

thoughtful reexamination of the moral education enterprise to encourage the teaching of morality itself in

a

more moral way.

Hence it

following
merits more extended treatment which I undertake in the

chapter

CHAPTER

II

THE COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH

Introduction

1.

In this chapter I will review the work of

.

the two cognitive-developraentalists who have contributed most toward

evolving

a

coherent theory of moral development:

Lawrence Kohl berg.

Jean Piaget and

Since the moral development corpus of the former

consists of one book: The Moral Judgment of the Child originally

published in 1932 and since the latter has contributed

a

steady stream

of articles, several of almost book length, since his doctoral disser-

tation on moral development was accepted by the University of Chicago
in 1958, this chapter will be weighted toward Kohl berg s work.
1

The

reader should be aware, however, that behind Kohlberg stands Piaget on

whom he relies quite heavily particularly for a general theory of
cognitive development.

Kohlberg' s own theory nevertheless is unique and

in many aspects he has gone far beyond his mentor as we shall see.

After looking at the work of both these men, I will cite some of
the confirmatory and contradictory findings of follow-up studies partic-

ularly of Kohlberg'

s

theory, offer my own critique, and suggest new

directions for future explorations particularly in the realm of affect
and action.
2.

Piaget and Moral Development

.

Piaget investigated Swiss

their attichildren's moral thinking somewhat obliquely by determining

tudes toward rules for

a

game of marbles.

16

He found that, because of

17

cognitive limitations, young children (ages 3-8) seem to confuse physical laws with moral rules so that they believe that rules are fixed,

external things rather than derived from human intentions and values.
The cognitive limitations contributing to this confusion are ’'realism",

that is younger children's inability to distinguish subjective from

objective experiences (e.g., believing a dream has some external
reality) and cognitive ego-centrism

that others perceive things from
selves.

a

,

that is an inability to realize

different perspective than them-

Moreover, according to Piaget, young children exhibit a

unilateral respect toward adults to whom they defer because they view
The combination of realism, egocen-

them as perfect and all-knowing.

trism and unilateral respect induce young children to view rules as
sacred and unchangeable.
mous.

Piaget terms this form of morality heterono -

His subsequent investigations confirmed his initial impressions.

He interviewed a number of Swiss children of different ages up to early

teens by asking their reaction to

who is more worthy of

a

a

series of stories.

For example:

reprimand , the boy who breaks one cup while

disobeying his mother by taking

a

cooky or the boy who breaks

tray of cups he didn't see while coming through

a

a

whole

He found that

door?

damage
younger children judged the wrong by the quantity of physical

done.

They also displayed

a

belief in immanent justice

,

that is that

misdeeds.
one could expect automatic retribution for
less bound
Older children, by contrast, appeared progressively

perspectives and were more trustby realism, more able to see others’
to completely deferful of their own judgments in counterdistinction

ring to their elders.

morality
They were also more inclined to judge

18

by intention rather than by the physical consequences of an action end

belief in immanent justice practically vanished by age twelve.

attributed these changes

l)

Piaget

to intellectual growth and 2) to experi-

ences of role-taking particularly among peers.

The latter, he

believed, was the principal dynamic of moral growth.

So long as adults

try to impose on children their own moral views they only reinforce the

unilateral respect and deference to superior power characteristic of
heteronomous morality.

Indeed, Piaget is pessimistic about the role

parents play in moral development.

"The 'average parent' is like an

unintelligent government, that is content to accumulate laws in spite
of the contradictions which this accumulation leads to." (Piaget, 1965,
p. 192).

He believed that the more mature, autonomous stage of moral-

ity is achieved primarily through the interaction of children among

themselves from which mutual respect, solidarity and reciprocity char-

acteristic of autonomous morality evolve.

Unfortunately Piaget has not chosen to pursue his investigations into moral development begun almost 45 years ago.

In an inter-

view several years ago he claimed to have "other pies in the oven."
(Hall, 1970).

His "other pies" have been principally in the area of

cognitive development and a new discipline practically of his own

invention called genetic epistomology.

He has remained a theoretician

philosoprincipally concerned with investigating a question asked by
the
phers and psychologists: how do human beings know and structure

world in which they live.

Educators are well advised to heed the words

of David Elkind (Piaget, 1968

,

English language interpreters:

pp. xv-xvi) of one of his principal
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Of particular note is the fact that Piaget nowhere points to
the practical implications of his work.... If one looks carefully
through Piaget's writings one seldom, if ever, finds an attempt
to deal with concrete problems of pedagogy or child rearing....
Some educators have engaged in certain teaching practices in the
name of Piaget. What should always be made clear in such cases
is that it is the educators interpretation of Piaget which is
being utilized and not Piaget's own ideas about educational
practice.
If Piaget has such, he seldom voices them.

Despite Piaget's own lack of interest either in following up
%

his initial research into moral development or in making practical

pedogogical suggestions concerning it, many subsequent investigators
attempted to replicate his studies elsewhere to determine if, indeed,
older and younger children display two distinct forms of moral
thinking.
Hoffman, (1970) summarizes much of the research undertaken and
I

will not repeat it here except to mention that the findings were

somewhat confusing.

For example, regarding the decrease in belief in

immanent justice as children mature, studies by Jahoda, (1958) of West

African school children and Dennis, (1943) of Hopi children confirmed

a

decrease in belief in immanent justice as Piaget's findings would
predict.

On the other hand, Havighurst and Neugarten ,(1935) found a

six out of
greater belief in immanent justice among older children of

children of the same
ten native American tribes than among younger
tribes.

Hoffman, NajarianIn a more recent study not mentioned by

among Lebanese children
Svajian, (1966) observed a similar phenomenon
belief in immanent justice
living in their native country among whom
twelve.
seemed to stabilize and not to diminish by age

Hoffman concludes that Piaget'

s

two-stage theory of moral

sequential phenomenon as
development is not a universal, invariant,
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cognitive developmentalists would assert.

This conclusion, however,

is premature and arises from a failure to distinguish between structure

and content in stage theory.

The confusion is understandable because

Piaget did not make the distinction in his work on moral thinking
(later in his work on cognitive development he elaborated the distinc-

tion quite clearly as we will see in

a

moment).

Nor did Kohlberg

initially observe the distinction as precisely as he could have which
led to a subsequent revision of his own stage theory of moral develop-

ment.

Before turning to Kohlberg himself, therefore, it might be help-

ful to explain how both Piaget and Kohlberg distinguish between structure and content in developmental stage theory.

Structure and Content in Stage Theory

.

The distinction grows

out of Piaget's later and more systematic study of cognitive processes.

For him

a structure is "a systematic whole of self-regulating transfor-

mations" (Piaget, 1970 cited in Stewart, 1974> P» 215).

It i s a system-

atic whole insofar as a set of laws apply impartially to 8n entire
system, for example to a set of whole numbers, or to the classification
of certain elements according to predetermined categories.

It is self-

each
regulating because elements within the structure interact with

other but remain within their own system.

whole numbers still leaves us with

a

Thus adding or subtracting

whole number, (plus or minus) not,

outside the system.
for example, with a fraction which would be

structure transforms its elements.

A

It is a dynamic process, classify-

reversing, etc., according to
ing, re-arranging, adding, subtracting,
its own self-consistent laws.

Thus, for example, when one grasps the

original sentences,
grammatical rules of language one can formulate
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paragraphs, stories, etc., while remaining
within the structure

established by grammar.

Mutatis mutandis both Piaget and Kohlberg
now claim that such
structures best explain the development of
logical and moral thinking.
A series of structures of ever-increasing
complexity and comprehen-

siveness called stages succeed each other in a universal,
invariant

hierarchical sequence.

Relying on Piaget, Kohlberg, ( 1969 ) explains

cognitive stages as transformations of earlier cognitive structures
as a person interacts with the social environment and the world.

Whatever data the person is presented with is assimilated within
given stage structure.

a

If the data are too diverse or complex a new,

more subtle and complex cognitive structure is required as an accommo -

dation of the thinking organism to this new reality.

This new stage-

structure reorganizes and reintegrates the former, more primitive
structure into itself.

Cognitive stages (both logical and moral) then

have the following general characteristics (Kohlberg,1969, pp. 348-349)

Stages imply distinct or qualitative differences in
children’s modes of thinking or of solving the same problem
at different ages.

1.

These different modes of thought form an invariant
sequence order, or succession in individual development.
While cultural factors may speed up, slow down, or stop
development, they do not change its sequence.
2.

,

Each of these different and sequential modes of thought
forms a " structured whole ." A given stage-response on a task
does not just represent a specific response determined by
knowledge and familiarity with that task or tasks similar
to it. Rather, it represents an underlying thoughtorganization. . .which determines responses to tasks which are
not manifestly similar....
3.

Cognitive stages are hierarchical integrations . Stages
form an order of increasingly differentiated and integrated
structures to fulfill a common function....

4.
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Content then is the data or information presented for consideration.

The way the information is handled however, will depend on the

stage of development of the individual.

A small child may group four

marbles and two rubber balls into a family where the marbles are the
"babies" and the rubber balls the "father and mother".

An older child

may group them according to their material, function (used in different
games) size, etc.

A still older person may hypothesize and attempt to

test out what they are made of, where they came from, what the experi-

menter wants to accomplish with them, etc., each according to his or
her stage of development.
To return to Hoffman's original objection to wit:

Piaget's

moral stages are not true stages, i.e., they are not universal nor
sequential because the phenomenon of immanent justice increases with
age in some cultures instead of declining.

structural characteristic.

Immanent justice is not

a

It is a belief, that is a content , arising

spontaneously among some young children because of cognitive limitations and sometimes reinforced by more general cultural beliefs.

The

limitations imposed by simpler cognitive structures should not be
confused with the beliefs to which they may partially give rise.
Secondly, according to Kohl berg, moral judgment is

reasoning distinct from logical thinking.
but not sufficient cause of the former.

a

sphere of

The latter is a necessary
Hence, even though one's

level of formal
logical thought processes may mature, say, to Piaget's

attainment of a conoperations, that in itself does not guarantee the

comitant level of moral reasoning.

It is therefore possible that,

in immanent justice
with cultural and religious reinforcement, belief
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may persist into adulthood and co-exist along with sophisticated
logical thinking.

This would be the result of more primitive moral

(and perhaps religious) cognitive structures which have not kept pace

with intellectual development.

Indeed it is precisely my contention

in this dissertation (to which I will devote more attention later in

this chapter and in chapter three) that while moral and spiritual

development require

a

cognitive base, they also require specific

treatment and attention in their own right.

Their evolution is by

no means an inevitable outgrowth of the development of logical tools
and skills.

An increase in belief in immanent justice with age, which

Hoffman considers so devastating to stage theory, because it seems
to reverse the purported sequence of development, is actually compat-

ible with sequential and irreversible structural development.

The

immanent justice phenomenon is explainable as a logical consequence
of arrested moral-structural development combined with reinforcing

cultural influences.

In Piagetian terms it could easily be the out-

come of a form of horizontal decalage or generalization as one

appropriates a stage more firmly and perhaps fixedly.

However, to

outlines
ascertain this, an instrument which detects the structural
be employed and
underlying the content of the responses would have to

this was not done in the studies cited.

3.

Kohl berg.

Lawrence Kohl berg .

Let us turn our attention now to

has been
Unlike Piaget, practically all of his attention

his doctoral dissertation
focused on moral development since he wrote
(Kohl berg, 1958).

all
From his own research he concluded that not
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aspects of Piaget's theory can be supported cross culturally.

Along

with an increase in belief in immanent justice in some cultures
already mentioned as contrary to the content aspect of Piaget's theory,
Kohl berg, (1968) cites evidence against Piaget's concept of unilateral

respect and the sacredness of moral rules for younger children.

Among

American children, rigidity toward game rules declines between ages
five and twelve (as Piaget would predict) however, attitudes toward

moral rules tend to become more rigid and reverential during the same
period.

Nor has evidence been found to support Piaget's contention

that peer group participation is a major factor facilitating development.

However, Kohlberg does cite evidence (Kohl berg, 1969) to support

the existence of three developmental characteristics of moral judgment

posited by Piaget in
cultures:

a

variety of Western, Oriental and aboriginal

Intentionality in .judgment .

1)

Young children in several

of these cultures judge an act as bad because of the physical conse-

quences (many cups broken accidentally) whereas older children consider the intention to do harm (one cup broken deliberately) as making
an act bad.

2)

Relativism in judgment

as wholly right or wholly wrong.

the adult view holds.

.

Young children view an act

If there is a conflict of opinion,

Older children are aware of a possible diversity

in views of right and wrong.

3)

Younger

Independence of sanctions .

children say an act is bad because it elicits punishment.
violates
children say an act is bad because it harms other,

Older
a

rule, etc

approach but
Believing in the fundamental soundness of Piaget's

discrepancies, Kohlberg set
also wishing to account for some of its
in his dissertation
forth his own stage theory of moral development

m

:
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1958, based on his interviews of 84 boys from ages 10-16.

Approxi-

mately ten years later, data from follow-up research forced Kohl berg
to revise his stage theory rather substantially, though he maintained

his basic six stage outline.

I will present the stages as he explained

prior to the revision and cite some of the confirmatory findings and
criticism of his theory and methodology.
reasons contributing to the revision.

Then I will give some of the

In separate sections I will

examine more closely a) how Kohlberg's theory of moral judgment relates
to emotional components of the personality and b) how it relates to

action.
A.

Kohlberg's Original Stage Theory

Kohlberg's original stage theory posited three levels of moral
development, the preconventional, conventional and post conventional.
stages.
Each level was subdivided into two stages for a total of six
as 1970
Here is how he described the levels and stages as recently

(Kohlberg, 1970a)

Definition of Moral Stages
I

PRECONVENTIONAL LEVEL

to cultural rules
At this level the child is responsive
but interprets
wrong,
or
and labels of good and bad, right
or the hedonistic
physical
these labels in terms of either the
of
exchange
consequences of action (punishment, reward,
enunwho
those
power of
favours) or in terms of the physical
following
the
comprises
ciate the rules and labels. The level
two stages:

orient ation The physical
STAGE 1 Pun ishment and obedience
goodness or badness
consequences of action determine its
of these consequences.
regardlessof the human meaning or value deference to power
unquestioning
Avoidance of punishment and
an
not in terms of respect.for
right,
own
arevalued in their
authority
and
by punishment
underlying moral order supported
(the latter being Stage 4).
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STAGE 2 Instrumental relativist orientation Right action
consists of that which instruraentally satisfies one's own
needs and occasionally the needs of others. Human relations
are viewed in terms similar to those of the market place.
Elements of fairness, of reciprocity, and equal sharing are
present, but they are always interpreted in a physical
pragmatic way. Reciprocity is a matter of "you scratch ray
back and I'll scratch yours," not of loyality, gratitude,
or justice.
II

CONVENTIONAL LEVEL

At this level, maintaining the expectations of the
individual's family, group, or nation is perceived as
valuable in its own right, regardless of immediate and
obvious consequences. The attitude is one not only of
conformity to personal expectations and social order, but
of loyalty to it, of actively maintaining , supporting, and
justifying the order and of identifying with the persons
or group involved in it. This level comprises the following
two stages:

—

"
STAGE 3 Interpersonal concordance or "good boy nice girl
orientation Good behavior is that which pleases or helps
others and is approved by them. There is much conformity
to stereotypical images of what is majority or "natural"
behavior. Behavior is frequently judged by intention:
"he means well" becomes important for the first time. One
earns approval by being "nice."

STAGE 4 The "law and order" orientation There is orientation toward authority, fixed rules, and the maintenance
of the social order. Right behavior consists of doing
one's duty, showing respect for authority, and maintaining
the given social order for its own sake.
Ill

POSTCONVENTIONAL , AUTONOMOUS OR PRINCIPLED LEVEL

moral
At this level, there is a clear effort to define
application
values and principles which have validity and
holding
apart from the authority of the groups or persons
s own
these principles, and apart from the individual'
has two
identification with these groups. This level again
stages:

rientation generally
STAGE 5 The social-contract legalistic o
tends to be defined
with utilitarian overtones. Right action
rights, and standards which
in terms of general individual
agreed upon by the whole
have been critically examined and
of the relativism of
society. There is a clear awareness
corresponding emphasis
personal values and opinions and a
consensus. Aside fro
upon procedural rules for reaching
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what is constitutionally and democratically agreed upon, the
right is a matter of personal "values" and "opinion." The
result is an emphasis upon the "legal point of view," but with
an emphasis upon the possibility of changing law in terms of
rational considerations of social utility (rather than freezing
it in terms of Stage 4 "law and order"). Outside the legal
realm, free agreement and contract is the binding element of
obligation. This is the "official" morality of the American
government and constitution.

STAGE 6 The universal ethical principle orientation Right is
defined by the decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen
ethical principles appealing to logical comprehensiveness,
universality, and consistency. These principles are abstract
and ethical (the Golden Rule, the categorical imperative); they
are not concrete moral rules like the Ten Commandments. At
heart, these are universal principles of .justice of the
reciprocity and equality of human rights and of respect for the
dignity of human beings as individual persons.
,

,

Kohlberg has followed the progress of approximately fifty of
the original group of male subjects whom he first contacted in 1958 up
to the present, reinterviewing them about every three years.

It is

from this longitudinal study that he claims the strongest evidence that
his constructs are true developmental stages, that is that they are

universal, structural entities which manifest themselves in an invariant sequence regardless of cultural influences (which may, however,

retard or even arrest development)

,

that each successive stage is a

its
structural whole, qualitatively different from its predecessors in

way of solving moral issues and, finally, that each stage is

a

higher

reasoning than
or "better" (i.e., hierarchical) integration of moral
its predecessors

— in

other words it builds on and integrates into

itself the structures found at lower stages but in

a

better differen-

tiated and more adequate and comprehensive way.
contention
Kohlberg' s methods of attempting to prove his
(philosophic)
combines both empirical (psychological) and logical

(
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arguments which are complex and difficult to follow.
referred to his 130 page article From Is To Ought:

The reader is

How to Commit the

Naturalistic Fallacy and pet away with it in the study of Moral Develop -

ment (Kohl berg, 1971a) for a lengthy philosophic treatment and to the
equally long Stage and Sequence; The cognitive developmental approach
to socialization (Kohlberg ,1969) for a psychological approach.

His empirically based arguments for a stage theory of moral

development may be summarized this way.
a.

Both cross sectional and longitudinal studies indicate

that older subjects show a greater use of higher stage thinking than

do younger subjects (Kohlberg, 1958 , 1969 , Turiel, 1969, Kuhn, 1976).
These stages do not necessarily prove that the subjects studied

progressed through the stages in an invariant sequence.

Intervening

stages might have been skipped or passed through out of sequence.

How-

ever, the findings do suggest a general progression in moral develop-

ment toward better differentiated and integrated ways of thinking.
b.

These general age trends have been found in as many as

White, 1975)
twelve different cultures (Kohlberg, 1969, Turiel, 1969,

village culture on
ranging from the aboriginal Atayals of Taiwan, and
the urbanized cultures
the Yucatan peninsula in Mexico and Turkey to

middle class, ghetto,
of the United States and Europe and include

delinquent and prison populations.

These research findings support

universality of stages across
but of themselves do not prove the
cultures.
c.

support to the
Some longitudinal research gives stronger

invariant sequence of moral development.

Kramer and Kohlberg, 1969 )

,
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reported on Kohlberg's original group of subjects a decade later and
found indications that their development throughout that period was
indeed according to the expected sequence with, however, a peculiar

"regression" back to Stage 2 apparently occurring for some at college
age.

Later Kohlberg, (1973) presented evidence that what at first

appeared to be a regression was in fact an intermediate stage (4^)

which in all cases studied subsequently gave way to higher (Stage

5)

moral thinking.
d.

Comprehension tests (Turiel, 1966, Rest, Turiel, Kohl berg,

1969, Turiel, 1969, Rest, 1971) indicate that subjects are unlikely to

skip stages because, while generally preferring statements reflecting

higher reasoning than their own when presented, they were unable to
comprehend or reproduce statements more than one stage above their
own.

In addition most subjects understand but reject moral arguments

based on reasoning below their own stage.

These two findings combined

suggest that the stages are truly hierarchical, that is higher stages
are successively more complex and adequate ways of dealing with moral

situations.

Subjectively individuals perceive the inadequacy of

one
thinking below their own stage, appreciate and aspire to thinking
of
stage above their own but are unable to grasp the complexity

their own.
thinking representative of stages two or more above

Hence

elementary moral thinking
they are unlikely either to regress to more
or to skip a stage in development.
e.

stage
Intervention studies involving support of higher

thinking and a "plus 1 match" (confronting

a

subject with another's

(Blatt and Kohl berg, 1973 )
arguments one stage above his or her own)
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or role-playing arguments from different stages (Turiel, 1966, 1969,)

also provide supportive evidence that, at least up to stage four,

upward movement is one stage at a time and permanent.
Kohlberg'

angles.

research findings have been criticized from several

s

Indeed the research cited does not provide conclusive confir-

mation of his stage theory.

Even James Rest, whose work with Turiel

and Kohlberg has already been cited, admits that "in most of these

studies one can find some flaw in design, or lack of controls or veri-

fication of assumptions’

1

(Rest, 1974, p. 66).

We now turn to some of

the criticisms leveled by others.
B.

Critical Evaluations of Kohlberg’

s

Moral Development Theory

Several critics (Hoffman, 1970, Kurtines and Greif, 1974,
study by Bandura and McDonald, (1963) as evidence

Simpson, 1974) cite

a

against Kohlberg’

contention that stage development is irreversible.

s

Bandura and McDonald theorized that role modeling, especially
adults, combined with

’’the

by-

manipulation of response reinforcement

contingencies" can alter children's moral orientation in whatever

direction desired, forward or backward.
a

They claimed that there was

significant tendency among the children (ages 5-11) who judged

bare physical
morality according to actors' intentions rather than the

when models
consequences of their deeds to reverse their judgment

focused on the physical consequences.

Other studies (Cowan, Langer,

Wolshim,1969) found
Heavenreach, and Nathanson, 1969, Le Furgy and
subjects).
similar results (the latter study used adolescent

The

initially appear, however.
findings are not so clear-cut as they would
moral concept (objective versus
Bandura and McDonald used a Piagetian

.
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subjective responsibility) which does not necessarily distinguish
structure from content (see discussion above)

More importantly they

.

do not distinguish between mimicking adult responses and genuine acquisition and retention of

a

moral structural capacity.

They provide no

evidence of any tendency among the subjects to generalize their regression from one attribute (intentionality) to others (e.g., preference

for expiatory punishment over restitution).

In addition, Cowan et al.,

(1969) found evidence that downward learning was less stable over time

(two weeks) than upward learning especially when the subjects were

dealing with new as opposed to retest items
the Bandura and McDonald study)

.

refinement missing in

(a

This latter finding creates the

impression that the children were experiencing social pressure that
contradicted their inner experience, pressure against which even most
8dults are not immune as Asch, (1955)

,

Krech et al., (1962), Milgram,

(1963) and others have amply demonstrated.

However, it does not prove

in
that their moral thinking had changed and the lack of perseverance

children
the apparent regression beyond a few weeks suggests the
was
tended to "rebound" to their original thinking once pressure

removed
The most systematic criticism of Kohlberg’

Kurtines and Greif, (1974)

.

The authors take

a

s

theory is that of

long hard look at the

flaws.
research adduced in support of Kohlberg and find many

For

s original moral develexample, regarding the reliability of Kohlberg'

reliability estimates
opment interview, they note that the only
interscorer agreement.
reported in any of the literature relate to
temporal stability or
There are no checks for internal consistency,

.
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reports of using a standard error of measurement anywhere.

In

addition, they echo a complaint of many others that no standard

scoring manual has been made available more than fifteen years after
the scale began to be used.

All these factors make it difficult,

they claim, to replicate the research findings and cast doubt on the

value of the test.

Kurtines and Greif also challenge the validity of some of the

research findings.
Turiel*

s,

In this they are followed by Simpson, (1974)

(1966) study comes under heaviest scrutiny because of its

ambiguous statistical results.

Working with 44 junior high boys,

Turiel attempted to induce stage movement experimentally by exposing

individuals to arguments on both sides of an issue derived either

from one stage above, two stages above or one stage below the subject’s own.

He predicted that the groups exposed to arguments one

stage above their own would shift more in that direction

(

+ l) than

the groups exposed to arguments one stage below their own (-1) or
two stages above (+2).
the - 1 and

-f

1 groups.

The findings were just the opposite regarding
The - 1 groups shifted slightly more in the

— 1 direction than did the

+

1 groups in the -4 1 direction.

However,

by comparing the f 1 groups with a control group which inexplicably

also shifted in the -

1

direction without any experimental intervention,

Turiel did find a result approaching statistical significance in the

direction of his initial hypothesis.
ever, that Turiel

1

(t = 1.43, p< .10)

s

Kurtines and Greif claim, how-

claim of a "borderline level of significance"
is not acceptable by usual standards.

principled subjects were involved in the study.

Moreover, no

(How could one present
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arguments one stage above Stage 6 or two stages above Stage 5?)

Thus

one third of Kohlberg's schema is not confirmed (nor disconfirmed) by
the Turiel study. Thus far, Kurtines and Greif
taken.

Other criticisms seem less incisive.

'

s

comments seem well

Their comments on the

Rest, (1971) and Rest, Turiel and Kohl berg, (19^9) studies in comprehen-

sion and preference do not fault the design and concede that the sub-

jects tested (fifth, eighth and twelfth grade students) do indeed

generally comprehend and reject prepared statements below their own
stage of moral judgment, prefer and comprehend statements one stage
above, and prefer but do not comprehend statements more than one stage

above their own.

However, Kurtines and Greif claim that the studies

"do not show that the normal course of development .. .follows the six
It should be noted, however, that

stages as defined by Kohlberg."

Rest, (1971) does not offer his findings as proof of the natural

sequence of development but as

a

demonstration of the hierarchical

nature of the stages, that is that each succeeding stage is a more adequate and comprehensive framework for making moral decisions.

Admit-

that
tedly this conclusion is a derivative one based on the assumption

perceived inadeone rejects thinking below one's own because of its
is perceived to
quacy, comprehends thinking one stage above because it

comprehend still
be more adequate and aspires to but cannot adequately
complexity.
higher stages because one cannot yet deal with their

Based

conclusion does not appear
on the evidence and logic, however, this

unwarranted.

alternative that
It remains for someone to suggest an

and Greif do not do.
better explains the data, something Kurtines
and Greif, alludes
Simpson, (1974) apparently following Kurtines

s
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to an alternative explanation of the data in Hoffman, (1970)

.

A look

at the section she refers to, however, yields only the comment by

Hoffman that the Rest, Turiel and Kohlberg data may "merely indicate
a tendency to reject concepts at lower developmental levels which the

individual has already abandoned" (Hoffman, 1970 pp. 280).

Taken as

is, this comment ignores the fact that the focus the Rest et al.,

study is not only on preference but on comprehension .

The subjects

not only rejected arguments from stages below their own but were able
to supply reasons why they did and why they preferred higher stage

arguments.

Moreover, Rest's 1971 study (which, of course Hoffman

writing in 1970 could not have known) indicates that subjects prefer
arguments above their own predominant stage.

Hoffman's earlier contention that

a

This coincides with

"more critical test of Turiel'

formulation would require demonstrating that exposure to advanced
moral concepts makes the child prefer them to concepts at his own
present level" (Hoffman, 1970, p. 280).

Rest demonstrates that this,

in fact, is the case.

criticize
Both the Kurtines and Greif and Simpson articles

stages based on cross
Kohlberg' s argument for the universality of the

cultural data.

Kurtines and Greif note that in Kohlberg'

s, (1969)

characteristics of the subreport no mention is made of sample sizes,
of scores, etc.
jects, the range and standard deviations

Although

and minimal descriptions of
Turiel, (1969) does provide sample sizes

Turkish village which he himself
the cultures studied (excepting the
investigated'.) their point is well-taken.

Kohlberg and colleagues

studies on which they base
have been lamentably slow in publishing
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many of their conclusions.

Simpson, (1974) simply asserts that the

study of only twelve different cultures is not enough to justify

Kohlberg's ’’sweeping assertion” that moral stages are universal phenomena.

Both she end Kurtines and Greif moke much of the fact that

none of the subjects in Turkey and Yucatan used predominantly principled thinking thus calling into question once again the universality
of the top third of the moral stages.

Their contention that the

universality of the moral stages cannot be definitively proved by
cross-sectional, cross cultural studies appears valid up to a point.

Such studies may confirm the existence of a higher percentage of
higher stages among older subjects when compared with younger subjects

from the same culture, however, they do not prove that individuals
move sequentially from lower to higher without skipping stages or
Only longitudinal studies can demonstrate

regressing to lower ones.

that with any certitude and in moral development the only long term

longitudinal study is Kohlberg's original group of American males.
However, a suasive (as opposed to a conclusive) argument can be made

that since similar (though not identical) age trends can be detected
this age
in several societies and that since in one of them (American)
•

trend can be accounted for most adequately by

a

stage theory of moral

same
development, it is not unreasonable to hypothesize that the
to the condynamic is at work in the others, at least until evidence

trary is adduced.

But the issue will not be resolved until cross

cultural longitudinal studies are undertaken.
biased and
Simpson's contention is that Kohlberg is culturally

conceptions or morality on
is attempting to impose Western philosophic
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other cultures.

She cites the lack of principled thinking in some of

the cultures studied not so much as evidence of lack of development in

these cultures as of Kohlberg's own preconceptions based on

Western philosophers.

a

few

She suggests that Eastern and Western ethical

philosophers are fundamentally irreconcilable and that there is no

underlying structural unity.

However, like so many others she appears

to confuse structure and content.

Take for example, the following

quote (Simpson, 1974, p. 103):

Perhaps our scientific search should be less for eternal
verities and universal invariance than for alternate and
creative modes of coping with truly universa l and eternal
(emphasis mine).
problems of .justice and liberty,

Kohlberg contends that it is precisely justice that underlies
all morality as a universal form.

It remains to be seen how Simpson

can speak of "truly universal and eternal problems of justice" without

betraying an underlying assumption that there are certain transcultural

norms governing the relationships of all peoples of whatever culture.

What standard does she use to speak of
justice?"

problem?

"

truly universal problems of

Is she imposing a Western conception of truth on a worldwide

Or, has* she attained enough distance from her own culture to

perceive rights and obligations which are owed and demanded of all
peoples?

bias.
If the former is true she betrays her own cultural

If

implicit viewpoint
the latter is true, it is difficult to see how her
justice as
differs from Kohlberg's explicit one which regards

a

trans-

cultural principle.
perceive at least the
It is not surprising that she does not
own view.
potential similarity of Kohlberg's and her

Her attempt to

(Simpson, 1976, p. 92):
describe Stage 6 morality is very misleading

s
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There is an inner natural lav containing a set of precepts
such as the value of human life which are valid for all
humanity and whose source is God or the nature of the
universe.
The emphasis on law (natural or otherwise) precepts and

authority are more characteristic of Stage 4 thinking than Stage

6.

More importantly the perspective implicit in this description is
static and self-enclosed.
(first evidenced in Stage

There is no awareness of the process
5

thinking) whereby just relationships are

According to the perspective presented by Simpson, the

established.

natural law or God ordains that human life is valuable and that humans
are bound to acknowledge the fact emanating from an authoritative
source.

According to Kohlberg, Stage 6 persons’ thinking differs from

this perspective at least three ways:

l)

it acknowledges the value of

human life as intuitively apparent rather than appealing to an
extrinsic authority or law to validate its worth and 2) it recognizes
that morality involves

values in

a

a

process of mediating this and other competing

just or fair way, e.g., how does one preserve the value of

life and the value of truthfulness in a situation where telling the

truth might cost someone their life but where not telling the truth

might lead to
3)

a

total break in communication and trust in

a

community?

To do this Stage 6 thinking assumes a perspective outside the

relationship of authority to subordinates and perceives how this and
princiother relationships within human society fulfill or contradict

ples of justice.
developOther more benign critics from within the cognitive
Kohlberg'
mental fold, while basically affirming the value of
biases.
research, hint that he may exhibit some unconscious

.
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Rest, (1974, p. 69) mentions the strongly individualistic orientation

of Stage 6 as opposed to a more socially supportive orientation and

suggests that this may derive from Kohlberg'

s

non-academic experience.

Kohlberg began his own adult life involved in action in which
the central moral question was under what conditions it is
right to disobey recognized authorities and to commit illegal
acts.
In his late teens at the end of World War II, Kohlberg
was involved in smuggling Jews into Palestine on a freighter
disguised as a banana boat. Unlike the Exodus movie and
Paul Newman, the boat was captured, and the whole crew,
including Kohlberg and the passengers spent some time in a
British concentration camp on Cypress. Here he says he had
some time to think about basic questions. In his formulation
of the higher stages of morality as well as in the set of
hypothetical moral dilemmas used in his research, the major
theme is how moral man can protect or promote human life and
dignity when lav/s or authority would compromise it
.

(emphasis mine)
Haan, Stroud and Holstein, (1973) relying on their study of

counter culture people in San Francisco, see another possible bias.

Kohlberg commonly speaks of "hippie culture" as being almost prototypically Stage 3, i.e., based on an empathic interpersonal concordance and support, much like an extended family, with little regard
The investigators offer an example of a

for larger societal issues.

counter culture response to the Heinz dilemma (whether a man should
steal an expensive drug to save his wife's life) which may, at first
glance, appear to be Stage 3.

say so, in

ray

Although the authors do not expressly

opinion the latter part of the response reveals a per-

spective on human relationships and society which is post conventional.

Replying to the question:
drug, the respondent says:

question of right or wrong.

is Heinz right or wrong in stealing the

"He's neither right or wrong.
He felt like he was compelled.

It's not a
..

.If his

be true to
background has led him to this action, then he should

.
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himself.

A companionate attitude is necessary to do the right.”

Up to this point, the reply seems to be Stage 3, that is moral

obligation derives from feelings for the person involved, although,
even here, there is some evidence of a perspective not ordinarily

available at Stage 3, an ability to philosophize, to generalize beyond
the specific situation.

The concluding part of his answer, however,

demonstrates that the respondent has a higher perspective.

"Companion-

ship comes before duty, that is companionship to everyone . .his
.

feeling toward his wife shouldn’t have any bearing on the issue.

He

should do it because of compassion for everyone ” (Haan et al., p. 611,

emphasis mine)
The respondent appears to understand the concept of duty

(typically Stage 4) and rejects it in favor of "companionship".

defines companionship not in terms of

a

He

small coterie of like-minded

relations or friends (Stage 3) but sees it as a quality one should
exhibit toward everyone .

He seems to be speaking of a universal affec-

tive dimension of morality which could correspond to Kohlberg’s more

cognitive conception of justice.
Haan et al., (p. 611) then offer the observation:

Since part of the fundamental developmental thrust of Kohl berg s
conceptualization is toward greater abstraction, objectivity and
rationality, it is not surprising that the moral reasoning of
persons who explicitly reject these criteria for making moral
decisions would be designated as "immature" by the Kohl berg
develsystem. More generally, the theory may appreciate moral
but
opment within societies organized on rational-legal bases
inadequately represent it when the fundamental organizational
principles are communal and are more immediately experienced
by the citizen.
1

observations serve
Taken together, Rest’s and Haan et al.,’s
have been able to
as a caution that Kohlberg himself may not
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distinguish clearly between structure and content in his own theory
and may have been deceived by some expression typical of one stage

of development so that he missed the underlying thought structure

which lent them a very different cast.
The criticisms discussed so far have concentrated for the

most part on the adequacy of Kohl berg's cognitive theory of moral
development.

I have not reviewed either Kohl berg's opinion or the

critics responses to two other vitally important aspects of moral

development theory, 1) the relationship of moral thinking to moral
action and 2) the relationship of affective and motivational aspects
of personality to morality.
C.

Moral Thinking and Moral Action
Philosophically Kohlberg considers himself something of a

Platonist regarding moral development (Kohl berg, 1970b)

.

He believes

that virtue is essentially one and is always the same ideal form,
"He

And he asserts that virtue is knowledge of the good.

justice.

who knows the good chooses the good" (Kohlberg, 1970, p. 58).

Psycho-

logically this second point is one of his most controversial contentions.

Psychoanalytic, behaviorist and learning theorists,

influence of
whatever their other differences, all assert that the

minor when
knowledge or reason on moral behavior is relatively
influences or unconcompared with either social and environmental

scious motivations.

undertaken by Kohlberg
Nevertheless several studies have been
that moral thinking is the
and others to support his contention

moral action.
single most important determinant of

several of these studies.

Let us now review
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Cheating and Moral Judgment

.

Kohl berg frequently cites

the well-known Hartshorne and May studies, (1928-1930) as evidence

that what he calls "The bag of virtues" approach to morality is

empirically unverifiable.

This approach is variously described as

training children, through reward, reinforcement, modeling, shaming,
love withdrawal, etc., to exhibit socially acceptable behavior.

Society or family determines what that behavior is to be and forms or
shapes the child’s behavior to conform to the pre-determined standards.

Naturally the elicited behavior varies from society to society.

Each

society, or institution within a given society, has its own list or
"bag" of desired behaviors.

"virtues" in

a

One of the most commonly reinforced

competitive society such as our own is behavioral

honesty i.e., not cheating or not cooperating with another in achieving
a common goal in a situation defined as individually competitive.

The

Hartshorne and May studies revealed that there does not appear to be
two groups of people, cheaters and non cheaters, one of which can
other
generally be counted on not to cheat in most situations, and the

which will probably cheat given the opportunity.

Instead, behaviorally

as
speaking, cheating appears to be a random variable "distributed",

moderate
Kohlberg says, "in a bell curve fashion around a level of

cheating" (Kohlberg, 1971, p. 227).

If a person cheats in one situation

or not he or she
there is no way to predict from that fact whether

will cheat in another.

predict
Kohlberg asserts, however, that one can

(given a knowledge of the
with some accuracy how someone will behave

level of moral think ing.
situational variables) if one knows the

He

and studies by Krebs, (1967) and
cites his own research (Kohlberg, 1958)
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Schwartz, Feldman, Brown and Heingartner, (1969) to support his
contention.

In his own (1958) work the product moment correlation

between maturity of moral judgment scores and teachers' ratings of the
subjects' conscience as evidenced in conformity to rules was .46.

Presumably one should conclude from that that the higher one's moral

maturity score, the less likely one is to cheat or violate other
socially defined norms.

The Schwartz et al., study (cited by Kohlberg,

1971 as Brown, Feldman, Schwartz and Heingartner) divided 35 under-

graduates into two moral judgment levels using a short form of
Kohlberg*

s

moral judgment test as a discriminator.

administered a cheating test to them.

Subsequently they

Only one of the nine princi-

pled subjects cheated against about one half of the conventional
subjects.

Krebs, (1967) in a study of 120 sixth grade children found

that 20 % of principled subjects cheated versus 67% of those at lower
stages.

While suggestive, these studies are by no means conclusive.
Krebs' findings particularly are questionable.

It seems hard to

principled level
believe that any sixth grade children have achieved a
of morality.

Nor does it even seem likely that 25 % of Schwartz

the principled level.
et al.,'s undergraduate population scored at

were conducted at a time
One must bear in mind that all these studies
between structure and
when Kohlberg had not adequately distinguished

content (Kohlberg, 1973)

.

is
At best all one can claim for them then,

high and low ends of the moral
that they support a distinction between
validity for individual
development scale but offer no such predictive
levels, to say nothing of stages.
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Delinquency and Moral Judgment

.

Fodor, (1972) compared 40

delinquent and 40 non delinquent adolescent boys who were matched for
race, age and verbal intelligence on the Kohlberg scale of moral

development.

He found that while both groups' modal score was Stage
3,

using a weighted score system that compares scores within a given
stage, the non delinquent boys scored significantly higher

two tailed test) than the delinquent boys.

(p-<^

.001

Ruma and Mosher (1967)

found that Stage 3 delinquent boys experienced more measurable guilt
than those with lower scores.

These findings suggest that a certain

amount of internalization of guilt or self-criticism evolves at about

Stage 3 and that this may be related to one's conformity to societal
laws.

This supports Kohlberg'

s

contention that the transition from

the pre-conventional to the conventional level is a critical one and

that those who do not make the transition remain relatively unsocialized.

However, more studies would have to be made to confirm this.

Kohlberg and staff have become involved in

a

prison experi-

ment with adults (partially reported in Kohlberg, Scharf, and Hickey,
1972) in which they analyzed the "moral atmosphere" of the prison,

that is on what level justice was administered on a day-to-day basis.

They found that the prison operated partly with Stage 4 fixed rule

standards and partly by Stage 2 manipulations of rules by the staff.
Inmates, however, perceived the administration of justice to be at

Stages 1 and 2.

Those inmates who were capable of conventional

thinking when considering moral dilemmas set outside the prison,
should do in
reverted to pre-conventional thinking when asked what one

analagous situation set within the prison.
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These findings suggest that any attempts to raise the level
of moral judgment in the hope of reforming law violators will have
to contend with the human moral environment and specifically with the

way justice is administered on

a

concrete, day-to-day basis.

Persons

who are deprived of their right to assume responsibility for their
own actions and to work them out in relation to others in a fairly

administered structure cannot be expected to progress very far
morally.

If anything, however, it diminishes Kohlberg’s earlier

contention that the moral thinking of the individual is a prime deter-

minant of his or her behavior and reemphasizes the impact of environ-

ment on the level of moral development one achieves.
3.

Block,

(

Political Action and Moral Judgment .

Ha an, Smith and

1968 ) conducted a study of political civil disobedience among

students at the University of California at Berkeley snd at

San Francisco State College.

The Berkeley students were faced with

deciding whether or not to sit-in at the Administration Building in
the name of political freedom on campus.

The researchers adminis-

tered Kohlberg’s moral judgment interview to 200 students.

They found

that 75% of the men and 86% of the women who were rated Stage 6 were

arrested for taking part in the sit-in.

Only about 10 % of the

conventional (Stages 3 and 4) men and women chose to sit-in.
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Table

:

Arrested in the Free Speech Movement
Sit-in at Berkeley

Moral Stage
Men

Women

2

345

6_

%

60

18

6

41

75

N

10

22

50

27

8

%

33

9

12

57

86

N

3

32

41

14

7

In his own commentary on the Haan et al., study, Kohl berg

suggests that for the Stage 6 persons and the Stage 3 and 4 persons
the situation was morally clear-cut.

The Stage 6 people believed

that their individual rights were being violated and therefore

protested.

The Stage 3 and 4 people perceived the sit-in as a clear

violation of rules established by legitimate authority and as
citizens" would have no part of it.

’’good

According to Haan et al., the

minority of conventional individuals who did in fact sit-in
asserted that "the University of California administrators had failed
in their role of authorities

— as

good authorities for Stage 3 and

as actual violators of proper legal understanding for Stage 4"

(Haan et al., 1968, p. 198).

Stage

5

subjects were almost evenly divided between sitting-

in and not sitting-in.

Again, according to Kohlberg, their contrac-

tual orientation provided no clear-cut decision.

Depending on how

students
they perceived the facts they could argue either that as

when they
they implicitly had agreed to abide by the school rules

contractually
were admitted to the university and were therefore
the university had
bound to obey them or, on the other hand, that
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violated its end of the contract and hence all bets were off.

Most interestingly, almost as great a percentage of Stage 2
instrumental relativist men chose to sit-in as Stage 6 (60% versus
75%*)

This confounding datum has been commented on by Kurtines and

Greif, (1974) as indicating that Kohlberg's stages are not good

discriminators of action.

What good is

a

scale when people who score

near the bottom and at the top act morally the same way?

Kohlberg's

reply (Kohlberg, 1971, p. 228) (though not, to my knowledge, made

directly to Kurtines and Greif) is that it is impossible to determine
the morality of an action simply by observing what someone does .

Edmund Wilson (and Thoreau) failed to pay income taxes as a
•matter of conscience' while millions of their fellow
citizens fail to do so for reasons of 'expedience'. The
behaviors are the same, and no psychologist can tell them
apart. There simply is no valid psychological definition
of moral behavior, in the sense that no observation and
categorization of behavior 'from outside', or behavioristically' , can define its moral status in any psychologically
valid sense. .. .Before we can know anything about ... behavior
...we must first know what a man's moral judgments or
principles are.
'

On a much more sophisticated level, many psychologists appear
to make the same mistake as some of the children whom Piaget inter-

viewed.

They believe morality is an external, "objective" fact.

But morality proceeds from the heart and the mind.

Piaget's and

Kohlberg's contribution to psychology is that they have reestablished
unempirthe psychological validity of what otherwise were considered
human
ical epiphenomena; the inner workings of the human mind as

beings grapple with their responsibility as

a

beings in the world.

the inner processes
To preserve a proper balance one can ignore neither

nor the actions emanating from them.

While it is true that the "road
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to hell is paved with good intentions” and that no amount of good will

or elegant thinking will make up for a Hamletesque failure to act, it
is equally true that unreflective action, even in apparent conformity

to an established moral code, can have equally hellish consequences as

recent adventures in unlimited warfare demonstrate all too well.
Kurtines and Greif insist on a theory that discriminates moral

from immoral behavior but no theory can separate moral behavior from
the inner thoughts, intentions and motivations which engender it, not

because of

a

deficiency in theory but because neither ’’moral" nor

’’immoral” has any meaning when these inner processes are ignored.

How then does one explain the odd fact that in the Free Speech

Movement Stage 6 ’’principled” thinkers found themselves allied with
high percentage of Stage 2 "instrumental relativists”?

a

Initially

Kohlberg (Kohlberg and Kramer, 1969) explained that a regression seemed
to occur among about 20 % of the brighter college students in his

longitudinal study who, after exhibiting a mixture Stage 4 and Stage

5

thinking in late high school, in college reverted to a Stage 2 hedonistic relativism "jazzed up with some philosophic and socio-political

jargon.”

This seemed to be a temporary regression, similar to

Erikson' s "regression in service of the ego,” because later the same

individuals returned to Stage 4 and Stage

5

reasoning.

It is quite

conceivable that students experiencing the disequilibrium of this

regression might in fact ally themselves with

a

presumably idealistic

movement while ins trumen tally serving their own needs.
would in fact be

a

The outcome

rather embarrassing coalition of principled with

self-seeking protesters.
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However well this explains the Berkeley data, evidence of any

form of regression is troublesome to a theory which is based on an
invariant and Irreversible sequence.

In fact it has led Kohl berg to

dramatically revise his theory and scoring system.

He now asserts

(Kohl berg, 1973) that l) there was no structural regression and 2)

Stages

5

and 6 (principled thinking) are adult stages found no earlier

than age 23 in his longitudinal sample.

The subjects who had appar-

ently retrogressed from a mixture of Stage 4 and

5

thought in fact

were at an intermediate or transitional stage between Stages 4 and

which Kohl berg calls 4^.

These subjects define morality in Stage 4

terms only to reject it.

They exhibit a form of "extreme ethical

5

relativism" i.e., asserting that the "morally right" is relative to

person's needs or wishes snd has no other validity than that.

a

There

is in their opinion no appeal to an objective standard beyond their

subjective needs or wishes.

Correlatively they manifest an ethical

egoism or individualism by asserting that the actor's viewpoint is
precedthe "natural" one, independent of and, by implication taking
ence over society's.

The notions of ethical relativism and egoism held by Stage 4£

subjects are quite different from authentic Stage 2 thinking.
4-J-

First

thinking understands but rejects arguments based on Stage 4

thinking, while Stage 2 thinking does not.

A Stage 2 person, for

example, cannot distinguish need or wish from duty.

person has

a

Moreover, at

A Stage Uk

concept of dutiful choice but denies its validity.
a

he or
person can deal with moral theory, that is,

given society to weigh the
she can assume a viewpoint outside of a

s
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moral validity of laws and rules.

As mentioned, a Stage 2 person

does not yet grasp the function of society beyond its being a mechanism for the gratification of concrete individual appetites.
Now Kohlberg asserts that what was once scored as Stage

5

thinking was actually a sophisticated Stage 4 thinking now called

4B (Kohlberg, 1973, p. 31).
In summary, our longitudinal data now suggests that Stage 5
is a stage reached in adulthood, not in adolescence. With
regard to Stage 6, something similar is to be said. Thinking
we labeled Stage 6 in high school was mis-classified. No
longitudinal subject in high school had been predominantly
Stage 6, nor has any become predominantly Stage 6 by the
age of thirty, either.
(Although we will not predict that
none will reach Stage 6.) Essentially, the material we
were scoring as Stage 6 was another form of sophisticated
Stage 4 thought, one which appealed to "conscience" and
"moral law" instead of "to the will of the majority" and
"the welfare of the greatest good."

As mentioned earlier this change in theory and scoring makes
it extremely difficult to evaluate research conducted using the old

methods.

Were Hasn, Smith snd Block's student protesters really st

Stage 6 or were they sophisticated 4B's?

And if so, how is their

thinking distinguished structurally from their non-protesting
brethren?

Only

a

thorough re-analysis of the data will provide an

answer to these and many related questions.

Kohlberg'

s

change of

theory and scoring has made necessary an entire new round of research
to back up his claim that moral judgment is the key to moral education

and moral action.

Rest, (1974) has suggested that moral development

research has entered a third phase.

The first phase was Piaget's

pioneering work published in 1932.

The second phase was Kohlberg'

work commencing in 195^ and ending about 19&9.
about 1970 with Kohlberg'

s

The third phase began

re-evaluation just reviewed.

This third
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phase poses many questions and provides few answers.

Rest proposes

a

few of them:

What kind of variable is moral judgment? How can one put
much confidence in what people say when there often seems
to be such a discrepancy in what they do?
How is one stage "better" than another? By what criteria
are higher stages said to be more advanced than lower
stages?
How can one know whether stages of moral development even
exist? How useful is it to study moral judgment in terms
of stages?
Is morality really as cerebral and intellectual as the
cognitive developmental approach suggests? What is the
relation between moral cognitions and affect?

How is moral judgment related to actual, real life behavior?
Up to this point I have attempted to review the research
related to the last question.

I will conclude this rather long

section with a look at the laboratory research of Stanley Milgram
on obedience which provides chilling evidence of the need for some-

thing better than conventional morality in our post conventional age.
In the final section of this chapter I will explore Rest's

penultimate question about cognition and affect in moral development.

Research in this area is sparse.

My explorations will be more

which I hope will
suggestive and based on clinical data and intuition

stimulate more systematic investigation.
4.

Obedience and Moral Judgment .

In addition to the Haan

Milgram experiments as
et al., study, Kohlberg frequently cites the
is prime determiconfirmation of his hypothesis that moral judgment

nant of morel action.
a

Initially reported on in 1963 (Milgram, 1963)

more recently been published
fuller exposition of the experiment has

:
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(Milgram, 1974)

.

As it was initially set up and in its many subsequent

variations, the experiment was designed to see to what extent an

ordinary person would obey an apparently legitimate authority by

inflicting pain on an innocent victim.

Specifically, subjects were

recruited from the general population of a small New England city to
take part in a "learning experiment" which apparently involved pairing

words from memory.

One person (a confederate of the experimenter) was

designated as "learner" and the other (always
by a rigged drawing) as "teacher".

a

naive subject chosen

Milgram, (1974) explains what

follows
The experimenter explains that the study is concerned with
the effects of punishment on learning. The learner is conducted into a room, seated in a chair, his arms strapped to
prevent excessive movement, and an electrode attached to his
wrist. He is told that he is to learn a list of word pairs;
whenever he makes an error, he will receive shocks of
increasing intensity.
The real focus of the experiment is the teacher. After
watching the learner being strapped into place, he is taken
into the main experimental room and seated before an impresIts main feature is a horizontal line
sive shock generator.
of thirty switches, ranging from 15 volts to 450 volts, in
15-volt increments. There are also verbal designations which
range from SLIGHT SHOCK to DANGER-SEVERE SHOCK. The teacher
is told that he is to administer the learning test to the man
in the other room. When the man responds correctly, the
teacher moves on to the next item; when the man gives an
incorrect answer, the teacher is to give him an electric shock.
He is to start at the lowest shock level (15 volts) and to
increase the level each time the man makes an error, going

through 30 volts, 45 volts, and so on.
mild one given
In fact no shocks were administered except for a

generator" actually
to the "teacher" to convince him that the "shock

worked.

the confedThe experimental paraphernalia and the acting of

no subject doubted
erate was so realistic, however, that virtually

series of increasingly painful
that he was in reality administering a
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shocks to a helpless "victim" strapped into a chair.

Because the learning experiment is rigged from the start, the

learner makes "mistakes" in a predetermined pattern and apparently
receives increasingly more severe shocks.

At 75 volts he grunts.

At

120 volts he complains aloud; at 150 he demands to be released from
the experiment.
a weak heart.

From then on he shouts, pounds and complains about
At 285 volts he lets out an agonized scream and at 330

volts he is not heard from at all, neither do his answers appear in
the signal box.

Meanwhile the "teacher" (the actual subject of the experiment)
looks to the experimenter for guidance and is encouraged to continue.
The experimenter uses several verbal formulas in prearranged sequence,
the strongest being "You have no choice, you must go on" and "assures"
the teacher that "Although the shocks may be painful, there is no

permanent tissue damage."

Milgram found that under the conditions described 62.5$
(26 of 40) of the subjects continued with the experiment to the very

end, administering, they thought, shocks of up to 450 volts.

the subjects refused to participate in the experiment.

None of

Only six

subjects (12.5$) quit at the time the victim demanded to be released.
The results were so dismally astounding that Milgram tried

several variations including one during which, to administer the shock,
the subject was required physically to press the victim's arm onto
the shock plate from the 150 volt level on.

In this "touch-proximity"

circumstance 42 . 5 $ quit at the point where physical force was demanded
of them.

Nevertheless, the majority continued with the victim

(
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protesting and screaming right beside them and
30% persisted to the
very end of the experiment.
Kohlberg, 1969 ) reports that he administered moral
judgment

interviews to the participants in one of Milgram's pilot
experiments

using 34 Yale undergraduates.

He found that 75% (6 out of 8) of

subjects he scored at Stage 6 refused to complete the experiment
(though even they must have participated by giving shocks at lower

voltage levels since Milgram reports that no one ever refused to

participate in the experiment once it was explained).
those at lower stages (including Stage

5)

quit.

Only 13% of

His finding is

suggestive but little more than that because the information he

provides is so scanty and, as we now know, he used his old scoring
system at that time (1963

?)

so that even his resistant Stage 6

subjects might now be classified as 4B.

A re-analysis of and more

extensive publication of his data related to Milgram'

s

study would

be extremely helpful but, to my knowledge, has not been forthcoming.

Milgram himself, (1974, p. 205) reports some "weak" findings
in the following areas:

Republicans and Democrats were not significantly different
in obedience levels; Catholics were more obedient than Jews
or Protestants. The better educated were more defiant than
the less well educated. Those in the moral professions of
law, medicine and teaching showed greater defiance than those
in more technical professions such as engineering and physical
science. The longer one's military service, the more obedience except that former officers were less obedient than
those who served as enlisted men, regardless of length of
service.

—

Nevertheless Milgram wonders "at how few correlates there were
of obedience and disobedience and how weakly they are related to

observed behavior" (p. 205).

54
It seems premature, at any rate, to assert that the level of

moral judgment alone determines how one would act in

a

given situation.

Milgram alludes to other factors (several of which will shortly be
considered) which he hypothesizes exerted virtually irresistable

pressure on most individuals to violate their own sense of morality or

moral judgment.

He concludes from the moderate to high level of

stress the majority of subjects experienced when administering the

shocks that by their own actions they were contradicting some inner
sense of right and wrong.

The ensuing conflict appears to have been

"between the deeply ingrained disposition not to harm others and the
equally compelling tendency to obey others who are in authority"
(Milgram, 1974, p. 42-43).

However, it could be argued just as validly that it was not

a

conflict between an inner moral code and external pressure that pro-

duced the stress so much as it was placing individuals in a situation
that was simply unresolvable from the level of moral judgment at which
they operated.

"Not harming others" and "respecting and obeying

authority" are both conventional moral cliches

— content-expressions

strucwhich suggest the existence of an underlying conventional moral

ture.

"Not harming others" would be more characteristic of

a

Stage

3

orientation (personal concordance) at which stage "niceness" and
authority"
"caring for others" is stressed; "respecting and obeying

suggests a Stage 4 (authority maintaining set).

If the majority of

were at the convenpersons participating in the Milgram experiments
Americans score at that
tional level (as seems likely since most
considerable stress because
level), they would very likely experience
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they would be unable to resolve the competing claims of the two

injunctions.

It also seems likely that, both because of their

cognitive confusion and stress and their conventional orientation,
they would obey an authority who seems to know what he is talking

about and calmly urges them to continue, as, in fact, was the case.
There are some other factors, however, which do not appear
to be purely structural but which nevertheless seemed pivotal in

this particular set of experiments.

As described by Milgram, they

appear to have both psychological and social components.

Among these

are:
1.

Politeness - based on anticipating feeling awkward if one
were to withdraw from the experiment.

2.

Narrowing of the cognitive field - individuals focused their
attention on the technical aspects of the task, e.g.,
articulating the word pairs precisely, pressing the switches
with great care, and apparently avoided concerning themselves
about the goals or morality of the experiment itself.

3.

Seeing oneself as not responsible - persons saw themselves as

not morally accountable because they were agents of an
external authority.
4.

Shift in moral sense - morality now is defined not as an
adherence to an internalized code or "principles" but as how
well one lives up to the expectations authority has of

a

person.
5.

Counteranthropomorphism -

a

tendency to ignore the human

experimental
beings in the experiment while believing that the

56

process has a validity of its own superior to the people who
conceived it or those who suffer from it.

"The Experiment"

acquires an impersonal momentum of its own.
on.

"It's got to go

It's got to go on," one subject repeated without

apparently questioning why.
6.

Post factum devaluation of the victim - frequently after
"shocking" the "learner" subjects would make such comments as
"he was stupid and stubborn and deserved to get shocked."

7.

Intellectual resistance - some subjects were completely
convinced that they were acting immorally but consoled themselves that, at least within, they were "on the side of the

angels."
8.

Fragmentation of the human action - in

a

variation of the

experiment the naive subject's responsibility was merely to
read off the word pairs while someone else administered the

"shocks."

In this instance 37 of 40 adults

(

93 %) continued

to the highest shock level on the generator while excusing

their behavior by saying the responsibility belonged to the

person who pulled the switch.
Some of these factors may be explained as defense mechanisms
of people who were acting in bad faith.

For example, in order to

any fellowcooperate in the experiment one would have to suppress
by attending to
feeling for the victim and this could be accomplished

experimenter's wishes, feeling
the technical details, focusing on the

helpless, etc.

did they
But this leaves unsolved the question why

first place?
feel constrained to act in bad faith in the

They were
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not physically forced nor were they threatened in any way.

It appears

that authority, especially when represented in person, for the vast

majority of people has a remarkably compelling quality quite apart
from any possible sanctions.

This seems particularly true in a compli-

cated social network such as our own which depends on the coordination

of a vast number of individual enterprises.
Kohlberg* s explanation that individuals do not resist a malev-

olent authority because they can not rationally justify
stance probably gets at some of the truth.

a

defiant

The ability to think for

oneself is the quality of an autonomous person.

But thinking and

acting in the face of social pressure to the contrary seems to
require self-reliance and courage possessed by few people.

And these

are not purely rational factors but belong to the fuzzy domain of
the "affective" to which I now turn.
D.

Moral Judgment and Moral Emotion
Both Piaget and Kohlberg have asserted that the cognitive

developmental approach by no means ignores the role played by emotion
or affect in human development.

They view the development of the

affective life as structurally parallel to cognitive development.
Thus Piaget, (1968, p. 15) writes:
intelThere is e constant parallel between the affective and
This,
lectual life throughout childhood and adolescence.
to dichotattempts
one
if
only
surprising
statement will seem
.... In
thoughts
and
emotions
omize the life of the mind into
in the
turn
constantly
most
reality, the element to which we
behavior
.All
...
itself
analysis of mental life is "behavior"
and
presupposes instruments and a technique: movements
and
motives
intelligence. But all behavior also implies
affectivity
final values (goals): the sentiments. Thus
constitute the two
and intelligence are indissociable and
complementary aspects of all human behavior.
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Kohlberg makes a similar assertion when he writes:

"Both

Piaget' s and our position. . .is not the position that cognition deter-

mines affect and behavior, but that the development of cognition and
the development of affect have a common structural base" (Kohlberg,
1969, p. 389).

Elsewhere Kohlberg emphasizes the importance of the

way one perceives and responds to experience as the crucial factor

which unites our cognitive and affective dispositions.

"Because of

its emphasis on ways of perceiving and responding to experience,

cognitive-developmental theory discards the traditional dichotomy of
social versus intellectual development.

Rather, cognitive and

affective development are parallel aspects of the structural transformation which takes place in development" (Kohlberg and Mayer, 1972,
p. 457).

One might conclude from quotes such as these that Kohlberg is

striving for an integrative theoretical approach which relates cog-

nition and affect in a mutually complementary way.

Indeed, in his

Stage and Sequence article, (1969), he depicts schematically how the

moral emotion "guilt" undergoes successive differentiations through
the stages just as more cognitive elements, such as "orientation to

intentions and consequences" do.

At the same time, however, he

reveals a bias in favor of the cognitive that appears, at least
partially, to contradict his efforts to achieve a balance between

cognition and affect.

Thus he states that the cognitive-developmental

the unfolding
theory "emphasizes that the core of development is not
of thinking but
of instincts, emotions, or sensorimotor patterns

human, general patterns
instead is cognitive change in distinctively
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of thinking about the self and the world.

The child's relation to

his social environment is cognitive; it involves thought and symbolic

interaction" (Kohlberg and Mayer, 1972, p. 457).

And again;

"While

motives and affect are involved in moral development, the development
of these motives and affects is largely mediated by changes in thought

patterns"

(Kohlberg, 1969, p. 390).

He leaves little doubt that for

him cognition is the primary determinant of moral development and he
seems to have abandoned his earlier attempts to work out the impli-

cations of a structurally integrated theory of cognition and affect.
In a sense one cannot blame him, for the word "affect" embraces an

immense and murky area of human experience which resist easy formulations and appears virtually impervious to scientific analysis.
Kohlberg'

s

treatment of guilt, alluded to above, illustrates

some of the limitations of his approach.

He considers guilt an

at
equivocal term which at one level could mean fear of punishment,

over a violated
another the experience of shame in the sight of others

over the vionorm, and still another a condemnatory self-judgment

lation of a self-chosen, ethical principle.

But again he displays

he differentiates the
some ambivalence; for, while, on the one hand,
of moral development, on
experience of guilt according to one's level
experience, bereft of its cogthe other, he reduces the emotional

nitive determinants, to

a

common physiological sensation.

"In some

stomach is the same whether it
sense, the feeling in the pit of one's

dread of one's own self- judgment.
is dread of external events or

The

one case the bad feeling is
difference between the two is that in

while
external sanctioning forces
interpreted by the child as fear of
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in the other case, it is interpreted by the child as produced by the

self’s own moral judgments"

(Kohlberg, 1969, p. 392).

If anyone were to spend a few moments, not interpreting their

experience of reality but simply living it, they would quickly realize
that their experiences of fear, shame and self-condemnation are quite

different, even apart from the significance psychologists may ascribe
to these emotions.

Even physiologically they are not reducible to a

"feeling in the pit of one’s stomach."

Each is a remarkably subtle

and differentiated experience involving a whole complex of thoughts

and feelings.

pit of one’

s

Shame, for example, may include that "feeling in the

stomach" commonly associated with fear but it also

includes a red and burning face, the effect of embarrassment over being

discovered by another to be acting at variance with socially approved
norms.

At a deeper level, it may also include a feeling of rage or

to
outrage that another (or part of oneself) is subjecting oneself

judgment and humiliation.

Recognition of one’s failure to live out a

as described
self-chosen ethical principle may include fear and shame

anger at oneself for
above, and in addition it may include elements of
sadness over one's
failing to live out one's ideals and contrition or

failure.

one's basic sense
It could also include a re-affirmation of

espouses.
of goodness and of the ethical principle one

possible
These are but a few, and by no means exhaustive,
the symbol "guilt,"
descriptions of the experiences summarized under

"moral guilt" has scarcely
and indicate that the investigation of
begun.

developmental school to come up
The failure of the cognitive
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with

a

truly balanced theory integrating cognition and affect may be

traceable to fundamental epistemological oversight on the part of its
proponents.

Kestenbaum, (1974) in an article entitled "On a certain

blindness in Jean Piaget" suggests that the great Swiss psychologist

does not pay enough attention to a phenomenological description of

human mental activity.

Instead, asserts Kestenbaum, Piaget limits

himself to just one aspect of human consciousness namely the child’s
attempt to understand one or other aspect of its experience.

The

child, however, experiences vastly more than what falls under the

focus of its immediate attention.

Kestenbaum, (1974, p. 83) quotes

John Dewey in this regard:
The greater part of mind is only implicit in any conscious act or state; the field of mind of operative
meanings is enormously wider than that of consciousness.
Mind is contextual, persistent; consciousness is focal,
transitive. Mind is, so to speak, structural, substantial,
a constant background and foreground; perceptive consciousness is process, a series of here and nows.

—

—

In terms of Gestalt psychology, the phenomenological field of

consciousness consists of

a

small focus of attention surrounded by a

vast field of general awareness.

Just as the eye focuses on one

point at a time but simultaneously embraces a broad perspective of
on
diffuse awareness, so human consciousness in general concentrates

but one tiny aspect at a time out of a huge potential.

Both eye and

ground relamind range from one point to another so that the figure/
is ground
tionship constantly shifts in a dynamic interchange; what

to recede into ground
at one moment becomes figure in the next only

at a third.

memories,
Out of the ground emerges percepts, feelings,

that we construct the
fantasies, thoughts, etc., and it is from these

-
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models of our world.

In comparison to the phenomenological, lived

world, the models we construct to understand our world are derivative

They are simplified constructs which more or less accu-

and formal.

rately summarize a complex array of experience.

The constructs are

crucial to human knowledge but should not be confused with the infi-

nitely richer and more complex world from which they are derived.

Kestenbaum contends that Piaget does not always observe the distinction
between the child's relatively narrow, formal construction of reality
(a derivation from the lived-world) and its variegated experience of

the lived-world with all its affective overtones.

Kohl berg seems guilty of a similar error.

The moral stages

which he has developed are constructs or models for understanding
reality.

Designed as they are to express common patterns emerging

from human experience, they inevitably simplify that experience for
the sake of coherence.

One makes a fundamental error if one confuses

the stage-models with the reality of experience itself.

A person who

more physstruggles with a real-life moral decision experiences much
expressed by assigning
ically, emotionally, and socially than can be
the thinking that
him or her a stage rating no matter how nuanced

went into the stage theory.

For the stage theory to continue to be

not to previous formuuseful, researchers must continually return,
experience itself in all its
lations or theories, but to the moral

complexity.

rely only on a strucAs long as Kohlberg continues to

of which is to detect undertured moral interview, the main purpose

continue to give undue weight to the
lying thought patterns, he will

cognitive aspects of morality.

bias,
In my opinion, to offset that
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a more phenomenological approach which in the beginning will be

content to describe on several levels (physical, intellectual,
emotional, etc.) and as exhaustively as possible the moral experience

itself without feeling constrained to fit it to a procrustean bed of
theory.

Only after the experience has been thoroughly described

should the second step of looking for commonalities and patterns be

undertaken.

A comprehensive theory of moral development synthesizing
thinking, feeling and action has yet to emerge partially, I suspect,

because of the sectarianism of the various psychological approaches.

At this point I will attempt to compare the cognitive developmental

approach with

a

theory of moral development derived from the analyt-

ical psychology of C. G. Jung.

Although at first glance the two

approaches seem and, in many respects, are vastly different, I
believe they are complementary approaches to the problem.

Each has

the potential to compensate for the deficiencies of the other and,

taken together, to provide a better balance between cognition and
affect.

Erich Neumann, a follower of Jung, some years ago published
a book entitled Depth Psychology and the New Ethic

,

(Neumann, 1969)

which has been translated into English only relatively recently.

In

of Kohl berg,
the book Neumann persues a theme which is reminiscent

namely that a "collective", or in Kohlberg's terminology,
tional"

a

"conven-

defining
ethic based on adherence to a prescriptive code

in today's
one's duty in every situation is not only inadequate

world but dangerous.

with the
No code-morality can hope to keep up

s
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variety and complexity of moral decisions demanded of us today.
Neumann claims that among

a

few a "new ethic" is emerging which

seeks to integrate not only our ego consciousness (which includes

moral judgments) but our unconscious motivations as well.

This new

ethic emphasizes individual responsibility, reminiscent of Kohlberg'

principled moral person who sometimes acts counter to group norms
and pressure, but orients to the good of society as a whole.

Although he has not worked out the implications for social justice in
anything like the detail Kohlberg has, Neumann obviously has the good
of society, or the "collective," in mind.

The new ethic "does not

merely take into account the ethical situation of the individual, but
also considers the effect which the individual's attitude will have
on the collective" (Neumann, 1969, p. 92).

Neumann differs from Kohlberg in his analysis of how an
integrated ethical awareness develops.

The main dynamic according to

Kohlberg is the progressive development of social role-taking ability.
The child, and eventually the adult, becomes increasingly sophisticated
in its ability to view a moral dilemma from the several viewpoints of

the individuals involved »

The pre conventional viewpoint tends to be

egoistic and to see the other only in terms of his or her relationship
to the self.

2
The self-gratifying role-taking perspective of a Stage

person is colloquially described by Kohlberg as "you scratch my back,
and I'll scratch yours."

The conventional viewpoint orients to family

felt relationand social roles, Stage 3 focusing more on empathetic,
social
ships of self and others and Stage 4 on a more unimpassioned

"position"
perspective which views self and others in terms of their
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in society.

It is only at the principled level that people can gain

a perspective "outside" society and view not only the complex role

taking within

a

given society but how society itself functions on

behalf or contrary to the needs and purposes of the human persons

who constitute it.

It is the "distance" provided by this perspec-

tive which, according to Kohl berg, enables individuals to challenge,

change and sometimes contravene societal rules and laws.
As we have seen, however, the perspective of principled

thinking alone does not seem to assure principled moral action.
Kohl berg himself seems to acknowledge that.

In his longitudinal

study (Kohlberg, 1973) ,he found that the few adults who had thus
far demonstrated predominantly Stage

5

thinking had enjoyed not

only a "moratorium" in college to broaden their awareness of perspectives different from their own but also had been faced with affec-

tively weighted social tasks which entailed making moral decisions
insoluble at the conventional level involving sustained responsibility, especially for others.

Milgram' s experiments and Lifton's,

also lend weight to the
(1973) investigation of Vietnam atrocities
of moral
power of affect to influence action even in contradiction

judgment.
Neumann, writing as he did more than a decade before
Kohlberg'

s

denies
dissertation was completed, neither asserts nor

the efficacy of role-taking.

He does, however, insist that modern

to the influence of
ethical thought pays insufficient attention

unconscious motivational factors on moral action.

Although he
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comments mainly on the motivational or affective components of morality
his "Stages"^” of moral development roughly parallel Kohlberg'

complement the latter's more cognitive orientation.

s

and

Neumann's first

"Stage" he calls the Stage of primal unity and roughly corresponds to

Kohlberg'

s

premoral and Stage 1 morality (Stages 0, 1.)

At this

"Stage", "there is no individual or conscious ethical responsibility"
(Neumann, p. 60).

Primitive urges and drives predominate as the ego

is barely differentiated from the unconscious.
is paramount.

Group responsibility

Any member of a family or tribe is considered respon-

sible for the misconduct of one individual.

Ethical imperatives, such

received them as
as they are, derive from the Founding Individual vho

Moral-

taboo.
some form of revelation and ere surrounded by religious

supernatural overtones.
ity is sanctioned by a superior power with

does between
Neumann does not make the distinction Kohlberg
somewhat deficient.
Stages 1 and 2 and in this his theory is

awareness of the individKohlberg' s Stage 2 sees the emergence into

through manipulation of the
uals' power of self-gratification
a primitive exchange.
environment and the needs of others in

For

ego occurs at a transitional
Neumann the emergence of the conscious
to
ethic" which roughly corresponds
"Stage" he calls the "collective

(Stages 3 and 4)
Kohlberg' s conventional level

.

At this

Stage

personally
of Law and individuals are
there is a conscious acceptance
What concerns us here is not so
responsible to the Law or customs.

Vumann's

him in the
"Stages" are not represented by

^bu^a^more descriptive
sequence^ irreversible"
S&5S
quotation marks.
anthropological; hence the
etc.

and
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much Neumann's description of the stages, which lack the precision of
Kohlberg's, as his explanation of the dynamics at work which effect
the transition from a primitive to collective morality.

As individ-

uals face the expectations which society has of them, in other words,
as they begin to assimilate conventional mores, they find that they

must conform to a set of rule expectations e.g., what "nice girls"
Since

and "good boys," "good students," "good Americans" etc., do.

these role expectations never embrace all the conflicting impulses
and emotions they want to follow, these must somehow be "cubby-

holed."

Intellectually, as Kohl berg says, a Stage

3

person may

reject as morally repugnant the self-serving motivations and reasons
of someone at Stage 2 and even provide convincing reasons for doing
so.

This does not change the fact that the person at Stage

3

also

experiences similar impulses to be self-serving (as do persons at
all the higher stages).

The difference is that the Stage 2 person

experiences
uncritically owns his or her self-serving impulses and

must either deny the
no dissonance while persons at higher stages
their own moral code.
impulses or admit they are somehow at war with

classical psychological
Those who deny their impulses employ the
to push their
defenses of suppression or repression and attempt

impulses partially or totally out of awareness.

In effect they disown

retreats into the unconscious
a part of themselves and this part

where it continues to influence behavior .

Those who do not employ

asceticism or training to control
these defenses utilize some form of

their impulses.

they do
Psychologically they are healthier because

themselves which they nevertheless
not suppress but own that part of
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vdew as unacceptable, unsocial or potentially evil.

The price they

pay is conscious suffering over the perceived discrepancy between
how they want to be and how they ought to be.
Neumann is at pains to point out that, despite the price,
this step in the evolution of moral consciousness is a necessary
one for the human race as a whole; for without it the differentiation
But for

of the ego from the unconscious would be incomplete.

individuals, especially those who totally repress their primitive
impulses, the price is high indeed.

Huge amounts of psychic energy

are diverted from life tasks to sustain the effort at repression

with a consequent numbing and deadening of the self.

Even more

important however, are the twofold dangers either that, too long
repressed, these forces will overtop the psychic defenses set against

them and eventuate in destructive behavior or the mechanism of projection will come into play and others will be accused and punished
(scapegoated) for the self's own banned impulses.

War, violence,

suicide, alcoholism, bias and discrimination are all outcomes, the

price of which society is less and less able to afford to pay.

In

violence and
fact, Neumann contends, our recent experiences of war,
of moral conracial suppression make it imperative that a new level

sciousness emerge, if the human race is to survive.

This he calls

the "new ethic."
principled morality
Neumann' s new ethic resembles Kohlberg' s
"outside" society, both are
in that both presume a perspective

society and both appeal
concerned with the establishment of a just

law and morality.
to principle as the force that sanctions

Moreover,
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they both believe that a moral person may and, in some instances,

must violate the accepted moral code in the name of something higher.
They differ as to what that "something

higher" is.

Kohlberg it is justice; for Neumann it is psychic wholeness.

For
Perhaps

even more importantly they differ in regard to the dynamic which

facilitates the emergence of the "higher morality."

I have already

mentioned that Kohlberg believes that the critical dynamic is continuing role-taking opportunities and especially exposure to differing

moral philosophies at college age which broaden one's role taking
perspective.

Other important factors mentioned by him are sustained

responsibility in

a

decision-making role as an adult and involvement

conventional level.
in real-life moral crises which defy solution at a
the
For Neumann the moral goal is psychic wholeness and

confronting one's
critical dynamic by which this is achieved is by

potential for evil.

all the
In Jungian terms this means encountering

subsumed in one's
repressed and suppressed parts of one's personality

personal "shadow."

those parts of
I need to go back and re-encounter

in order to be considered "good"
uryself which I felt I had to disown

myself.
in a conventional sense by others and

Even assuming that I

cannot exempt myself from the
exhibit principled moral thinking I
myself.
task of confronting the shadow in

morality with which

I

According to a principled

everyone
intellectually agree I ought to treat

value of persons.
with an equity based on the equal

At the same time

in a
myself there is a "character" who
I need to admit that within

ego and who would exhibit blatant
sense, is set over against my

destroy those who oppose me and
favoritism to those who gratify me,
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manipulate everyone to serve me.
demands

a

the way.

More frighteningly this character

hearing and will not tolerate simply being pushed out of
A trickster, he will subvert

ray

noblest aspirations and ell

the while point the finger of blame at those around me.

The shadow

is a part of me and by a queer paradox, an internal justice demands

that he get an equal hearing.
I do not intend to go into the complexities of Jungian theory

regarding the shadow, for example, his conception of it as both
personal and archetypal, however, a distinctive difference between
Jung's and Kohlberg's thought is apparent: Kohlberg is striving for

a

unified theory of moral development organized around the central concept of justice.

Neumann and Jung construct their theory of morality

around paradox.

They assert that there are intellectually irreconcil-

able dichotomies in the human personality and consequently in morality
too.

No matter how elegant and satisfying to the mind a unified

theory is it runs the danger of leaving out crucial, albeit messy,

elements of human experience.
chology.

This experience is not unique to psy-

As Jung himself says "By way of comparison, we might mention

theory of light,
the equally paradoxical corpuscular theory and wave

although these do at least hold out the possibility of

a

mathematical

(Jung, 1969,
synthesis, which the psychological idea naturally lacks"
p.

532).

embrace is between
The paradox which the "new ethic" seeks to
toward all, reasonable, worked
the principle of justice and fairness

tendencies of the shadow,
out and implemented and the antinomian

willful, arbitrary, selfish and destructive.

To allow the latter into
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the light of day and to say "this is part of me, too," is frightening,
but to deny its existence is even more dangerous for then self-

deception, denial, projection and scapegoating run wild.

How each person reconciles the duality within remains for each
to decide.

A genuinely autonomous morality means accepting the respon-

sibility for making one’s decisions and even accepting the possibility
of doing evil according to one's best light.

This most emphatically
It does mean

does not mean surrendering to destructive impulses.

admitting their existence within me and likewise admitting that my

most "moral" actions are tainted with an ambiguity which makes it
impossible to call them simply just.

The danger of a Stage 6 morality

in practice if not in theory, is that those who have attained that

rarefied level of thinking will mistakenly believe that they have

transcended the human condition and its complex, often contradictory
emotions and desires.
To extend the paradox a bit further, it would appear that

despite what I have said thus far about the apparent irreconcilability
do
of the Jungian and Kohlbergian approaches to morality, they both

orient toward justice.

Kohlberg of course, does so explicitly.
Jung says:

and Neumann do so through their concept of duty.

Jung

"The

collective
ethical problems that cannot be solved in the light of

morality or the "old ethic" are conflicts of duty
would not be ethical" (in Neumann, 1969 , P* 14

,

,

otherwise they

emphasis his).

The

the mediating of
duty or obligation by which I am bound refers to

claims of my ego over
competing claims within myself especially the

well as the claims of other
against my unconscious and its contents as
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persons.

This concern for an "internal justice" is not unique to

Jungian psychology.

While Jung speaks of complexes and archetypes,

Gestalt Therapy speaks of polarities such as "top dog" and "underdog",
and transactional analysis of "ego states".

While differing as to

theory all assert that each element of the personality should receive
its proper due in relation to the others in a system analagous to a

parliamentary democracy.
The Jungian concern for justice extends further, however.

A person owes his or her own integration to self and to others in
justice, for the fate of society in fact depends on how well its

members relate to each other free of projection and biases, which makes

possible the social role taking so prized by Kohl berg.
ness contributes to a just community.

Psychic whole-

Indeed the just community will

not come into being without at least some of its members taking the
risk of looking at their own potential for both good and evil.
Conversely psychic wholeness cannot exist unless the individual is

willing to subject his or her life to rigorous moral scrutiny.
The implications of this approach for moral education are

immense.

As I will consider in chapters four end five, it will not be

sufficient merely to teach people how to solve complicated moral

dilemmas like "brain teasers".

Moral education must challenge individ-

they
uals to look into themselves and confront the light and the dark

find there.

It will hsve to teach them how to deal with the forces,

fears and fantasies that will inevitably arise.

term commitment, analagous to

a spiritual

will not be for the faint of heart.

It may involve a long-

formation or internship.

Techniques such as guided

It
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fantasies, role playing, dream analysis, and relaxation and meditation

techniques may be interspersed with more cognitive considerations of

moral psychological and social theory.

All of which will have the

purpose of integrating the thoughts, feelings and actions of persons
into an integrated whole.

CHAPTER

III

MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND SPIRITUALITY

Introduction .

In Chapter two, I outlined Kohlberg' s theory

of moral development, reviewed some reactions to it, and offered a

critical evaluation.

In the present chapter, I will use Kohl berg's

research into moral development as a jumping-off point to investigate
a related area which, if anything, is even murkier than morality,

that of spirituality.

There is a theoretical and a practical reason for doing so.
Theoretically, Kohlberg's research has led him to ask questions about
the moral enterprise that are more philosophical than psychological.

Convinced that morality of some sort is a universal human phenomenon,
he asks, is there any compelling reason why we should be moral?

What

sense does committing oneself to the principle of justice make when
the world, both natural and human, is manifestly unjust?

Empirical

not
research into the forms of morality which in fact exist does
behind
supply an answer to the question of the motivating force

morality.

According to Kohlberg, an answer can be found only by

shifting to

a

different level of discourse namely by addressing

oneself to the religious question (Kohlberg, 1973).
spirituality in this
The practical reason for considering
for millions of
context is that spirituality is a vital concern
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people, yet there exist few but the most subjective criteria to guide

anyone interested in exploring this realm and in evaluating the many

competing claims.

There is a profusion of religious or quasi reli-

gious movements in the United States ranging from the conservative

evangelicals, charismatics and faith healers among the Christian

churches to devotees to Buddhism, Sufism, Hinduism, and other established religions from the East.

In addition, there are those unique

hybrids which seem to grow so well in American soil such as, EST,
Arica, TM, Mind Control, Scientology, among legions of others, many

claiming to have a scientific basis but all, despite occasional disclaimers, assuming religious or spiritual overtones.
The somewhat weedy richness and more than occasional bizarre-

ness of American spirituality can cause considerable confusion in the

mind of the onlooker.

The carnival atmosphere which frequently sur-

rounds some of the religious personality cults can easily distract the
serious student from the importance of the religious question itself

inclining one to dismiss the whole affair as hokum.
mistake.

That would be a

As I hope to illustrate in this chapter, whether asked by a

Harvard professor like Kohlberg or by a potential teenage convert to
Rev. Moon, the religious question continues to be one of the most

important concerns of humankind.
spiritIn this chapter I propose to explore the religious or

ual question as it is posed by the individual.

Basically,

I

see this

value in life.
as a question as a search for ultimate meaning and
to the question to
Next, I will briefly treat a subjective "response"

more broadly, the
which many people appeal, namely the mystical, or
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peak experience.

Finally, I will propose a schema borrowed from devel-

opmental psychology which will, I hope,

(a)

provide the means to fit

the so-called mystical experience into the broader category of spirit-

uality, and (b) fit spirituality itself into the still broader category
of personal development.

A Descriptive Definition of Spirituality .

Before proceeding to

the substance of the chapter, a descriptive definition of spirituality

seems in order to avoid at least some of the confusion which inevitably
I have preferred the word "spirituality" to

arises around the subject.

"religion" because the latter rather strongly suggests an organized
social body with its own set of beliefs, rules, and practices.

What

I

am more concerned with here is the individual's personal experience and

response to that experience.

I am quite conscious, however, that these

occur in a social context and that both experience and the response to
and interpretation of that experience will be greatly influenced by

social religious factors.

I

am also aware that "spirituality" strongly

implies concern with a non-material reality or realm of Spirit or
spirits,

liy

concern in this chapter, however, is not with the existence

or non-existence of such a realm.

In the present context spirituality

experience, undermeans, pertaining to the highest realm of human

standing, and endeavor, that which is most human.

In light of this, I

as: The domain of ultioffer the following definition of spirituality

rien c e and/or define
mate meaning and value which individual s expe

f or

attempt to orient their
themselves and around ^hir.h they orient or

l ives

are meaning, value
Three important elements in the definition

end commitment.

Frankl, (1963,
It is my contention, borrowing from

.
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1967), that meaning is crucial to psychological health.

I

suggest that

spirituality is precisely the realm of ultimate or superordinate meaning.

The spiritual question is, what does my life signify?

it its overall organization and purpose?

the persons asking the questions

— the

What gives

The answers are as various as

miser might derive meaning and

purpose from the pursuit of money, the monk, of enlightenment, but consciously or not both are organizing their lives around a central

meaning or purpose, that is, creating

a

spirituality (I leave until

later in the chapter a consideration of the relative value of each)

Value is employed in the definition to indicate that the ultimate meaning referred to is not meaning in an abstract sense but
involves some form of personal affirmation and involvement because of
its perceived worth.

Meaning and valuing lead to commitment

,

an attempt

to live out meaning in action, not in a haphazard fashion but as the

pole-star which guides one's life.

It might better be described as a

magnetic field that influences and orients everything within its boundaries.

The resemblances between this definition of spirituality and

morality— say Kohlberg's concept of justice— are apparent.

Justice

might appear to lend meaning and orientation to one's moral actions at
least.

However, justice must ultimately appeal to something else for

its validity as

a

goal in life and hence is not in the realm of ulti

mate meaning and value.

Let us return for

a

moment to Kohl berg to

perceive this more clearly.
Posing the Religious Question .

Kohlberg claims that

a stage

marks the acme of moral
six understanding of and commitment to justice

y
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development.

More recently, however, in

a

more philosophic bent, he

has suggested (Kohlberg, 1973) that, in one sense, the achievement of

stage six creates more problems than it solves.

remains just that, an ideal.

The ideal of justice

The philosopher, however, who descends

from the ivory tower and attends to the world, perceives something
very different; neither humankind nor nature seem overly concerned with
being just.

No system of merit or virtue can account for the

nature dispenses its rewards and punishments.

via

Some are born bright,

others imbeciles, some to good health, others to disease and an early
death, some to wealth, others to grinding poverty, some are wiped out in

earthquake, flood, or fire, others live out their days in tranquility.

Nor has humankind seemed overly committed to righting natural inequities.

Rather, it has permitted snd encouraged the grossest social

injustices to burden even further those already deprived by nature.
Our philosopher may perhaps be unmoved even by these facts, but

when his or her own flesh is touched for example, by enduring injustice,
failure, illness, or the death of

injustice rises from the heart.

a

loved one, then the cry against

Kohlberg contends that perhaps the

greatest cry is wrung from us when we perceive the inevitability of our
own death.

Why be moral when we and all our endeavors end up in exactly

the same place as the person who cares not a whit about morality?

Is

the
not striving for justice merely one more form of self-deception,

acting out of an illusion that what we do in

really matters?

a

meaningless universe

reasonThere is, Kohlberg asserts, no level of moral

kinds of questions.
ing, which can provide an answer to these

A com-

and one must enter a different
raitment to justice is not self-validating

•
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level of experience.

Comparing his approach with Erikson's he states

it this way (Kohlberg, 1973, p. 53):

Erikson's ideal man has passed through his sixth stage of
genera tivity and becomes an ethical man, an ideal corresponding
to our Stage 6. There remains for Erikson's man a task which
is partly ethical, but more basically religious (in the
broadest sense of the word, "religious"), a task defining a
seventh stage whose outcomes are a sense of integrity versus
a sense of despair.
The problem of integrity is not the
problem of moral integrity, but the problem of integration,
and integrity of meaning of the individual's life and its
negative side, despair, hovers around the awareness of death.
The problem is also psychological. The concept of the self's
integrity is psychological, but the concept of the integrity
of the meaning of the self's life is philosophical or religious.
As Kohlberg states the problem, it appears to be an issue that

arises rarely snd only among those who have attained a Stage six level
of morality (less than one percent of the population)

.

It would

scarcely account for the number and variety of spiritual "trips" in
this country.

There are not too many people with either the leisure or

the inclination to view their own death in this light.

Most are too

taken up with the practical concerns of living, or so it would seem.
If we, therefore, believe that a spirituality generally evolves from an

existential encounter with death, then we are accounting for only

a

small percentage of the many spiritualities existing today.

There are, however, persuasive arguments to the contrary.
from
Ernest Becker in his Denial of Death (1975) asserts that, far

being the concern of

a

few philosophers and/or neurotics, "the idea oi

nothing else; it
death, the fear of it, haunts the human 8nimal like
is the mainspring of human

activity— actively designed largely to

in some way that
avoid the fatality of death, to overcome it by denying

it is the final destiny of man"

(Becker, 1975, P» ix )
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Becker was a cultural anthropologist but his writings span

several disciplines including history, psychology, and philosophy.
In The Denial of Death

,

first published in 1973, be reinterpreted the

psychoanalytic concept of psychosexual development in a broader, more
existential manner as stages in the universal, human attempt to find

meaning and value in the fact of death.

Against the argument that

few people, much less children, are consciously preoccupied with death
he responds (Becker, 1975, p. 13):
If the child has no knowledge of an abstract idea like
absolute negation, he does have his own anxieties. He is
absolutely dependent on the mother, experiences loneliness
when she is absent, frustration when he is deprived of
gratification, irritation at hunger and discomfort, and so
on.
If he were abandoned to himself, his world would drop
away, and his organism must sense this at some level; we
call this the anxiety of object loss. Isn't this anxiety,
then, a natural, organismic fear of annihilation?
It is Becker's contention, then, that this fear of annihilation,

this basic experience of creaturely dependence and insecurity, is with

us all the time albeit at an unconscious level even in our earliest
years and is merely the psychological recognition of the
truth:

ontological

we are in fact creatures whose existence is precarious and

limited.

very long.

This reality is too stark for any of us to keep before us for
It is too painful to bear snd it would likely paralyze us

if we thought about it much.

Hence, to some extent, our attempts to

repress that dawning knowledge is a healthy step.

According to Becker,

then, what the Freudians called "anality" is in fact

meaning.

a

crisis in

of human
We, who desire to occupy center stage in a world

that we occupy but
meaning and purpose are forced to confront the fact
a

tiny corner of

a

universe vaster than any attempt to imagine it.
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It is a universe which, if not random, eludes by far, our attempts to

determine its unifying meaning.

This split between what we can grasp

and what we aspire to is symbolized by our bodies.

We have heads that

look up to the heavens and anuses that tie us to the earth.

We are

gods, but gods-who-shit, desiring immortality but subject to transient,

biological processes, decay and death.

The so-called "anal" response

is an attempt to control our fate by an excessive concern for order,

structure, and cleanliness.

If things get out of order, if we lose

control, then we risk being submerged in random disorder and death.

Similarly the "oedipal project" has much more than sexual overtones.

We desire to be our own fathers, "causae suorum"

and therefore, immortal.

,

self caused

We embark on life-long projects, raising

families, establishing businesses, and involving ourselves in causes,
all of which create in us a sense of meaning, purpose, and worth in the

face of death.

Transference too is reinterpreted by Becker as an unconscious

attempt to find meaning outside ourselves by identifying with someone
or a cause greater than ourselves.

He sees this as a universal phenom-

enon not limited to the transaction between therapist and patient.

Certain people whom we encounter seem to possess
charisma which captures us.

a

special mana or

Similar to the phenomenon of falling in

and service that
love, transference inspires us to a level of devotion

is puzzling to observers.

Becker interprets this as an inevitable and

and value in our
basically healthy projection in order to find meaning

lives.

gives to the devotee
The suppressed fear of death, however,

the relationship.
the sense that everything is at stake in

To lose
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the other person, to become disillusioned with the cause, to see the

project or business fail, brings the person, at least momentarily, up
against the repressed reality that "all this will pass"
and no one endures.

,

that nothing

As Kohlberg's Stage 6 hero wonders about the

worth of the moral project, so Becker's existential seeker wonders
about the worth of any project in the face of death.
Becker, then adds some breadth to Kohlberg's tentative ventures

Although some

into the relationship between morality and spirituality.

may balk at his reliance on such concepts as anality, oedipal stage,
and transference weighted as they are with Freudian connotations, he

convincingly develops his central thesis that one of the unifying concepts behind human activity is to experience and express meaning and

value in an existence circumscribed by space and time.

He lends cre-

dence, therefore, to our contention that spirituality—understood

meaning and
according to the definition offered above as the domain of

value around which people orient their lives

— is

a central human

concern deserving of further systematic inquiry.
a legitimate one let
If the spiritual question appears to be

the limited space availus now spend a few moments investigating, in

offered to the quesable in this chapter, the answers traditionally
tion.

answers as there are
There are, of course, almost as many

would involve
people and a comprehensive review of them
all philosophic and religious thought.

I

a

survey of

will limit myself here to

commonly called the "relidescribing the outlines of that phenomenon
in virtually all religions.
gious" or "mystic" experience found
of meaning in the face
Traditionally the answer to the problem
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of evil and death has been some sort of transcendent experience giving

rise to the conviction that, despite suffering and death, everything

will be all right.

This type of experience has been given many names,

a conversion experience, a mystical trance, enlightenment, satori and

more recently, with Maslov, a peak experience.

Insofar as these

experiences speak to the problem outlined thusfar, they convey a
fundamental, intuitive sense that everything ultimately cooperates
for the good.

This usually happens as the result of experiencing some

form of "cosmic consciousness" during which the person feels a sense
of oneness with and participation in the universe.

For Kohl berg its

essential "is the sense of being a part of the whole of life and the

adaption of a cosmic, as opposed to a universal humanistic (Stage
perspective" (Kohlberg, 1973, p. 55)

•

6)

This experience may or may not

include a belief in God (Ibid., p. 56):

Even most persons who are not "religious" temporarily
achieve this state of mind when on the mountain top or
before the ocean. At such a time, what is ordinarily
background becomes foreground, and the self is no longer
figure to the ground. We sense the unity of the whole and
ourselves as part of that unity. This experience of unity,
often treated as a mere rush of mystic feeling, is also
associated with the structure of conviction.

William James in his The Varieties of Religious Experiences
religious phenomena,
(1902), still a standard text for students of

cites many examples of experiences of this nature.

One such example

"cosmic conconcerns Richard Bucke, himself the author of a book on

sciousness" at the turn of the century.

He describes his own experi-

evening with
ence while riding home in a hansom from a pleasant

friends (James, 1902 , pp. 380 - 381 ):
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My mind, deeply under the influence of the ideas, images,
and emotions, called up by the reading and talk, was calm
and peaceful.
I was in a state of quiet, almost passive
enjoyment, not actually thinking, but letting ideas, images,
and emotions flow of themselves, as it were, through my mind.
All at once, without warning of any kind, I found myself
wrapped in a flame colored cloud. For an instant, I thought
of fire, an immense conflagration somewhere close by in that
great city; the next, I knew that the fire was within myself.
Directly afterward there came upon me a sense of exultation
of immense joyousness accompanied or immediately followed by
an intellectual illumination impossible to describe. Among
other things, I did not merely come to believe, but I saw
that the universe is not composed of dead matter, but is on
the contrary, a living Presence; I became conscious in myself
of eternal life.... I saw that all men are immortal; that the
cosmic order is such that without any peradventure all things
work together for the good of each and all; that the foundation
principle of the world, of all worlds is what we call love,
and that the happiness of each and all is in the long run
absolutely certain. The vision lasted a few seconds and was
gone but the memory of it and the sense of the reality of what
it taught has remained during the quarter of a century which
I knew that what the vision showed was
has since elapsed.
true. That view, that conviction, I may say that consciousness,
has never, even during periods of the deepest depression, been
lost.

Not all mystical experiences are as powerful as this one but

from such experiences as these James deduced four common characteristics (Ibid., p. 380-381):
1.

Ineffability

.

It is an experience that is fundamentally

incommunicable to others.

In this regard it is more like

a

feeling than an intellectual state.
2.

Noetic quality .

The experience does, however, include an

intuitive
"understanding", but it is an understanding which is

rather than discursive.

In the experience itself, the meaning

clear.
of life, suffering and death appears

The experience

"answer" to the
contains or perhaps more accurately is the

absence of meaning.

However, it seems impossible to communi-
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cate this answer to others.

James notes that because of

their incommunicable nature these experiences have no

authority to compel others outside the experience to accept
the "truth" contained within.

The experiences do, however,

"break down the authority of the non-mystical or rational
consciousness, based upon the understanding and the senses
alone.

They show it to be only one kind of consciousness.

They open out the possibility of other orders of truth, in
which, so far as anything in us vitally responds to them,

we may freely continue to have faith" (James, 1902, p. 332).
3.

Transiency .
half hour.

Mystical experiences seldom last more than a
However, from such experiences an underlying

development can take place based, as it were, on the insights
gained from these transient events.
4.

Passivity

.

The experience seems to happen to people rather

than being initiated or generated

frr

Certain voluntary

them.

preparatory events such as prayer, meditation etc., may or
be of
may not precede it but the event itself appears to

wholly different order.

a

As James describes it, "the mystic

indeed somefeels as if his own will were in abeyance, and

superior power"
times as if he were grasped and held by a
(Ibid., p. 381).
is
The outcome of the mystical experience

a

feeling of assur-

certitude, that even in the
ance, a state of virtually unshakeable
the mystic has experienced
face of death, life has meaning because

that meaning in an almost sensuous way.

The experience described,
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then, is not

a

natural outgrowth and reorganization of

a

lower cogni-

tive or moral stage, a higher level of abstraction or of justice;

rather it appears to be radically discontinuous with what precedes it.
It pertains to

a

different way of knowing too little understood in the

western intellectual tradition.

In a unique way, it appears to unite

the concrete and specific with the abstract and universal, intellect
and will with emotions and sensations to create an experience of

wholeness and oneness with Being.
More recently Maslow (1970) has ascribed similar attributes to

what he calls ’’peak experiences' which he believes to be natural
1

expressions of human nature.

In these experiences "the universe is

perceived as an integrated and unified whole..." a perception so
profound that "it can change the person's character and his Weltanschauung for ever after" (Ibid., p. 59)

•

The cognition of being

(B-cognition) is more detached from human concerns and instrumental-

ities so that the world is perceived as it is in itself (what Kohlberg
calls

a

"decentering of the ego"), rather than how it may be used.

to
The experience is self— validating, that is it needs to appeal

nothing else to justify it and life itself.

"Peak experiences can

make life worthwhile by their occasional occurance.

meaning to life itself" (Ibid., p. 62).
beautiful, worthwhile, etc.

They give

The world is seen as good,

In the process evil is accepted and

and polarities.
integrated into the whole as are other dichotomies

passive, that is as
Like James, Maslow sees the peak experiences as

more humble and
happening to the person and rendering him or her

ready to listen.

dying the
They can even parallel the experience of
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"good death", that is they include an element of
reconciliation and

acceptance of death.

People simultaneously feel more like themselves,

active, capable, and responsible and more able to transcend
themselves
to become, at least relatively, selfless and egoless.

From the description it would appear that mystical or peak
experiences would be extremely rare occurances.

Maslow, at one time

divided his subjects into "peakers" and "non peakers"
and did not have peak experiences.

— those

who had

Gradually, however, he became

convinced that some sort of peak experiences were available to virtu-

ally everyone and that those who did not report them were afraid of
them, suppressed them, and managed to "forget" them.

He suggested

that for those with mechanistic or materialistic world views, peak

experiences had no place and were interpreted, when they did occur,
as threats to their sanity.

His opinion, to my knowledge, was more

impressionistic than backed up by hard data.
More recently, Greely (1974) has attempted to determine how

frequently mystical or peak experiences do occur in the general
population.

He conducted a national survey composed of 1467 subjects.

"With what frequency have you felt

Among the questions he asked was:
as though you were very close to

a

powerful, spiritual force that

seemed to lift you out of yourself?" (Greely, 1974, p» 140).

In a

preliminary analysis of the data he reports that thirty— five percent
of his subjects responded that this had occurred once or several times
in their experience.
is not at all rare.

It would seem that this type of experience then,

Greely, who describes himself as "a hard-nosed

rational empiricist skeptic" and "one of the least mystical persons
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I know"

(Ibid., p. 123), speculates that perhaps 50% of the American

population has some form of mystical or peak experience, some of which
may not fall under the type of question framed in his questionnaire.

Although investigations like Maslow's and Greely'

s

leave much

to be desired in terms of providing us with hard data, they do suggest

that there exists

a

wide-spread phenomenon of human experience which

by its own power and illumination conveys to those who undergo it the

concrete conviction and understanding that their lives have meaning
in the cosmic scheme of things.

Because these experiences are sub-

jective and essentially incommunicable it would seen that, apart from

describing and cataloguing them, psychology would have little to say
about them.

However, these experiences happen to human subjects who

are subject to the same developmental schemata as everyone else.

Mystics invariably interpret their experiences both to themselves and
other people.

The quality of these interpretations depends on the

individuals cultural background, world-view, and level of development.
mystics
Moreover, it has happened more than once in human history that

disastrous consehave spearheaded social revolution, frequently with
quences.

describes
To note just one negative instance, Cohn (1970)

as John of Leyden,
the depradations of one John Bockelson, known

sixteenth century anabaptist and apparently

a

a

genuine, though unbal-

103-106).
anced, mystic (Cohn cited in Greely, 1974, pp.
of book-learaing
The Anabaptist boasted of their innocence
who had been chosen
and declared that it was the unlearned
they sacked the cathedral
by God to redeem the world. When
tearing up, and
they took particular delight in defiling,
its old library
burning the books and manuscripts of

—
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Bockelson s first important act (as the new ruler of the
city of Munster) was characteristically at once a religious and a political one. Early in May he ran naked
through the town in a frenzy and then fell into a silent
ecstasy which lasted three days. When speech returned to
him, he called the population together and announced that
God had revealed to him that the constitution of the town,
being the work of men, must be replaced by a new one which
would be the work of God....
1

—

—

What followed was a new legal code encompassing a strange combination
of puritanical morality, socialism, and sexual license (for men only)

cruelly enforced.
Terror... was intensified during Bockelson s reign. Within a
few days of his proclamation of the monarchy Dusentschur
(a Bockelson sympathizer) proclaimed that it had been revealed
to him that in the future all who persisted in sinning against
the recognized truth must be brought before the king and
sentenced to death. .. .Within a couple of days, executions
began. The first victims were women; one was beheaded for
denying her husband his marital rights, another for bigamy
for the practice was of course entirely a male prerogative
a third for insulting a preacher and mocking his doctrine.
1

Instances to the contrary, of course, can be cited of other

mystics who made monumental contributions to society as well.

I

note

others, to
this one example, in fact, representative of hundreds of
and subemphasize that while mysticism is frequently a very private

social
jective experience, it can and sometimes does have potent

consequences.

the
It behooves us, therefore, not only to respect

concerned with
uniqueness of the mystical experience, but also to be

development of those
the overall intellectual, moral, and emotional

who have them.

how
For it is on this development that will depend

relate it to their everyday
mystics make sense of their experience and

experience and life.
with mystic overtones
The fact that many spiritual movements
far as
to want to remove themselves as
in the United States today seem
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possible from social involvement, does not guarantee that this will
always be so.

In fact, some, such as the Arica training, exist for

the express purpose of effecting a social change of consciousness.

However laudable the goal, mystical awareness is often combined with
social naivete and sometimes something worse.

A friend of mine

recounts how during his advanced training as an Arican, many of his
co-trainees, (who would soon be training others), regularly stole

money and valuables from each other.

Evidently, their level of social

consciousness had not yet matched the heights of their mystical
aspirations.
It seems therefore, that mysticism or, in secular terms, peak

experiences, do play an important role in assisting some people to
come to terms with the meaning of their lives.

It is then an impor-

tant, and perhaps a necessary ingredient for those who seek a meaning
and value which reason alone cannot provide them with.

However, as

must also be becoming apparent, mystical or peak experiences need to
be integrated into one's overall psychological and social make-up for
a genuine spirituality to come into being.
I

will now, therefore, propose some tentative criteria which

should enable the investigator to determine how effectively

a

given

to
form of spirituality (with mystical overtones or not) contributes

human development overall.

Developmental Criteria .

As long as a mystical experience

it has no influremains personal and uncommunicated, and as long as

it does not figure
ence on how one orients and directs one's life,

as

a

part of

a

person's spirituality as

I

defined it earlier.

Once,
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however, it is recognized as a basis for meaning and purpose in life
and one begins to act in light of the significance and direction

provided by it, then

a

social dimension begins to manifest itself.

A private, subjective phenomenon, as it were, goes public.

It is at

this level that it is capable of being studied and evaluated according
to developmental criteria.

The experience itself may be ineffable and

essentially incommunicable, but this does not discourage people from
attempting to understand their experience, to fit it into schemata

derived from their everyday experience, and to communicate what
happened to others.

This they can only do according to the level of

personal and social adjustment they have attained.

Thus a John of

Leyden, a Francis of Assisi, a Don Juan Mateus, a Baba Ram Das, have
all probably had ineffable mystical experiences but each has received
it within the context of a unique personal and cultural history which

can be observed and to some extent, evaluated.

It is at this level

that I believe some of the developmental insights of Piaget, Kohl berg
and Loevinger can be employed fruitfully.

What I offer below is a

developtheoretical schema, based on no data, which attempts to adapt

mental theory to types of spirituality.

In this schema, I will attempt

source of meaning in
to describe how individuals view the ultimate

their lives and how they relate to that meaning.

In addition, I will

at each stage.
suggest what might be typical feeling responses
of social relationships
Finally, I will attempt to express what kind

might derive from a given attitude.

I do not offer these descriptions

developmental sense outlined
as stages in the strict cognitive

m

successively more adequate and
Chapter two, that is an invariant and
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8t stage 1 is

M

equivocal tan,

since meaning here
tends to be identified
with an
extrinsic and arbitrary
power or exercise of
power.
The universe is
conceived of as operating
by force
or sometimes conflicting
forces of either a
personal
or impersonal nature
outside the individual.
The
force on forces supply
our basic physical needs
(sometimes) in an arbitrary
way.

As a result, life

is a hazardous enterprise
and an important
ingredient

for survival is unquestioning
subordination to the

powers that be.

Part of this subordination
involves

the observance of taboos
about certain places, objects,

and things.

Violation of the taboos carries
with it

an automatic reprisal and
a cutting off from the

power source.

This can only be undone by
some form of

propitiation which has the effect
of re-establishing
contact with the source.

Fe eling Response is a feeling
of fear and awe in the
sense described by Otto
(1958) that is not simply fear

—
93

of someone stronger but fear of something uncanny and

basically unfathomable.
Social Relationship .

This deference to a superior

spiritual power carries over into other relationships

especially those involving
association.

a

spiritual fraternity or

Authority is exercised and deferred to

absolutely.

Stage 2 - Source of Meaning resides partly outside the individ-

ual and partly within.

In both cases, it remains

somewhat arbitrary and fragmented depending as it does
on the fulfillment of various needs as they arise;

one cannot always know from moment to moment what needs

will be foreground.

The extrinsic source can be a

supernatural power or the demands of society (conceived

concretely at this stage as this or that person "in
power” or simply another person.

The individual

relates to any of these three as having sets of needs
similar to one

1

s

own and is willing to "trade off" to

fulfill each other's needs conjointly (Kohlberg's
"you scratch my back; I'll scratch yours").

In a

formally religious context this involves the invocation
need
of magic, to give the "powers that be" what they
to the
while simultaneously compelling them to accede

individual's needs.

Some forms of "chain-prayers

,

novenas, and even certain aspects of sacramental
compliance.
prayers reflect this attitude of compelling
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Feeling Response is of self assertion and derives
from increased awareness and acknowledgement of
one's own needs as having a certain validity over

against the extrinsic demands of others.

What is

still lacking, however, is sufficient ego strength
to pull together various competing needs within

oneself to organize and direct them towards self-

chosen goals.

Fulfillment of the needs are the

goals and the highest meaning at this stage.

Social Relations exist only to facilitate the

gratification of individual needs.

Relationships

are basically opportunistic and manipulative and

may involve a trading in spiritual goals.

For

example, one may desire a spiritual "high" (a kind
of spiritual hedonism) because the "high" makes one

feel good and affiliate with an organization
(usually at some cost) to obtain it.

There is no

common goal or commitment involved} only individuals
seeking to gratify their own needs (Something like
who
this may have been in effect among the Aricans
and
saw no conflict in their spiritual quest

stealing from each other).
from intro jected values
Stage 3 - Source of Meaning derives
social and religious
of one's family, and immediate

milieux.

for the
At this stage, one is concerned

first time with

a

this
sense of self-worth which, at
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point, comes from the approval of others.

The

tension between self and other is adjusted to

by-

internalizing the demands of others in the form
of a "conscience" (the Freudian Superego, the
T. A.

Parent, the Gestalt "Top dog") while pre-

serving one’s own resistance (the Id, or Child,
or "Underdog").

The former, however, tends to pre-

dominate, if socialization proceeds apace, because

self-worth is more or less confused with survival.
If one is not approved of, one will be excluded

from the family or group making survival impossible
(not always a mere fantasyl).

Therefore, individ-

uals derive the greatest meaning they are capable
of at this stage from the family, social, or

religious symbols of their immediate environment.

Feeling Response is
to please.

a

need for approval and a desire

This is combined with an increased

ability to appreciate the feeling states of others
(empathy). -There is also a tendency to disown

socially unacceptable feelings and either to repress
and/or to project them onto others.

Social Relationships

.

becomes important here.

Belonging to likeminded groups
In a religious context, the

small religious group or church predominates.
stark
"Fellowship" is emphasized but is sometimes in
or noncontrast to the reaction toward outsiders
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believers which is often intolerant and hostile.

A slightly less hostile response is the fervid
"evangelization" of non-believers to rescue them

from their own ignorance snd, incidentally, to
reassure the believers that their own way is the
truth.

Stage 4 - Source of Meaning

.

Systematized creeds, normative

writings, and traditions derived from one's cultural

milieu became paramount definers of meaning for
One's sense of identity and self-

the individual.

worth shifts from parental approval to a sense of
belonging to a larger social body.

Personal

meaning is mediated through society, religious,
and/or secular.

Institutions take on

a

hallowed

quality and are seen as sources of absolute value
e.g., the Constitution, the Apostles'

Papacy etc.

Creed, the

Society, its institutions and tradi-

tions, is seen as a bulwark against social chaos
and personal loss of identity.

tive within

a

From one's perspec-

given social meaning system other

systems are acknowledged but only as inferior

approximations or opponents of one's own.

The world

Communism, the
is divided between Capitalism and

true believer and the infidel.

The individual

the observance
emphasizes and tends to identify with

of forms, roles and conventions.
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Feeling Response is a strong sense of loyalty to
Church, Country, Party, combined with intolerance

of the opposition.

Unacceptable feelings and

impulses are projected onto other groups.

Social Relationships include reverence toward
superiors (what the Romans called the social virtue
of "pietas" ), and a strict adherence to and

administration of socially defined responsibilities.
One tends to relate to roles, not people.

The

value of the person increases or decreases according
to the position occupied by him or her in the social

structure.

"Heretics'* or "Communists" are outside

the pale and therefore, not entitled to the same

respect as those within.

Stage

5 -

Source of Meaning .

At this stage

a

crisis of

meaning develops as individuals encounter meaning
systems which possess a validity apparently equal
to their own.

They become aware, because of an

increased time perspective and sense of history,
of the cultural conditioning and somewhat adventi-

tious nature of their own construction of meaning.

As in the moral realm, this sometimes leads to

a

period of anomie so in the spiritual realm it can

result in a kind of existential despair.

All

meaning and purpose is called into question.

One

institutional
is freed from one's social role and
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•'faith" only to lose one's sense of direction

altogether. For others, perhaps more optimistic,
the search begins for a unifying principle or

principles within oneself and among the multi-

plicity of creeds and dogmas, for both a cognitive
and an existential-experiential ground of meaning.

These people tend to seek a more personal and

immediate means of relating to this ground of

meaning rather than being content, as were those at
Stage 4, to have that meaning mediated to them
through institutions and social structures.
Historically, in the West, Martin Luther embodied
this attempt.

Institutionally, however, his attempt

failed for the most part, because his followers,

probably not at his level of development, merely
substituted one institution, the bible as inter-

preted by the various Protestant "divines" for
another, Roman Catholic tradition as interpreted by
the pope.

Today similar incidents occur as many

young people reject traditional western meaning
systems, both secular and religious in favor of

eastern models.

The context of belief changes but

merely from
in many instances the transition is
by
reliance on a western tradition as interpreted

eastern traone's local pastor to reliance on an

dition as interpreted by a guru.

Meaning and value
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remain extrinsic to their own experience.

Feeling Response .

Characteristic of this stage is

a growing sense of identity as a person distinct

from one's role within society.

This seems to be

a uniquely western phenomenon. While reorganizing

and actively encouraging and reforming human insti-

tutions, people at this stage predicate the value
of institutions on how well they contribute to the

expansion and growth of persons rather than predicating the value of persons on how much they
contribute to the institution or the collective.

Social Relationships tend to be ecumenical and
inclusive rather than sectarian and exclusive.

The

principle of tolerance is willingly affirmed.

Stage 6 - Source of Meaning subjectively depends on the individ-

uals own experience and understanding of his or her
self.

Included in this is (a) a level of self-

knowledge that includes an awareness and assessment
of one's defenses and projections;

(b)

being in touch

with that larger and more comprehensive self that
underlies but embraces our social selves (Jung's
persona) and our ego personalities.

Various systems

give this larger whole different names.

Jung calls

etc.
it the self, Assagioli the superconscious

being is
Essentially one perceives that one's own

of meaning and
or can be a self-validating source

.
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value.

Concomitantly one perceives the underlying

unity joining self and the world.

The duality of

self and other, self and the world is overcome so

that meaning is not an arbitrary self-ish choice
but understood to be synchronous with the objective

order of things.

This appears to be one of the

more important insights intuitively grasped in

mystical or peak experiences.

The experiences,

however, are not always integrated well enough to
be expressed cognitively or socially perhaps because

the individual has not developed far enough.

Feeling Response

.

One's sense of identity compre-

hends the whole self rather than the ego and con-

comitantly one experiences a sense of oneness with
the cosmos sometimes described as "oceanic feelings".

This may be combined with the resolution to dedicate

oneself to the goals toward which everything is

moving
Social Relationship

.

One recognizes the essential

oneness of all creation and relates to all people
as brothers and sister.

This carries over to one's

inanimate
relationship with other life-forms and even

matter.

Examples of this may be found in the writings

of Francis of Assisi

— see

his Canticle to the Sun

and Teilhard de Chardin.
the most
This sixth stage, is of course,

101

hypothetical of all and well beyond my own
experience.

Hence, I can only describe it

"from below" as I imagine it might be.

Mysticism and Development

With the exception of the sixth stage, none of the stages
described above assumes the necessity of mystical experiences.

It

seems quite possible that one could develop a spirituality, that is
a meaning system around which one would attempt to organize one’s

life, without a mystical transport.

As mentioned previously, the

miser has organized such a meaning system around money, no matter how
impoverished that system might be.

probably be at Stage 2 )

.

(At best, such a person would

On the other hand, neither should we exclude

mystical experiences from the lower stages as Kohlberg by implication
appears to do.

But according to the venerable saying of the Medieval

which
schoolmen "Quidquid recipitur, ad modum recipientis recipitur",
in modern paraphrase may be translated:

how you process what you take in."

"Who you are will determine

The signal being sent may be

capacity to
stereophonic but a crystal set will reduce it to its own

receive.

Thus a John of Leyden translated his "vision" into

a

reign

orientation.
of terror, probably because of a Stage 1

A pentecostal

into
fundamentalist may translate a similar experience

a

Stage

3

with strong, emotional
relationship with a very personal Saviour

overtones and found

a

community of the "saved" who are very loving

have not yet "seen the light"
toward each other, but exclude those who
etc.

orientation that I would posit
It is only to achieve a Stage 6

intuitive, visionary experience,
the necessity of some form of

.
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combined, of course, with the developmental maturity to assimilate and
to express it creatively.

As Kohl berg accurately notes, there is no

rational, logical resolution of the problem of evil and death which

ultimately must be integrated into

a

comprehensive meaning system.

Voltaire long ago skewered with his mordant wit those who made fatuous
attempts to argue from reason that this was the best of all possible
The oneness, meaningfulness, and ultimate goodness of all

worlds.

that is must be experienced not argued.

And to do so, discursive

reason must, temporarily at least, step aside.

Thus eastern systems

such as zen literally dumbfound the mind with insoluble koans to

distract it, thereby allowing for the breakthrough of

a

deeper,

intuitive reality and western systems speak of the "via negativa" and
the "dark night of the soul" in which reason shuts down before a

reality which it can only apprehend as darkness.

At our present level

of understanding, however, psychological and/or spiritual techniques

can only prepare the way for that most mysterious of all human

phenomena
Whoever, therefore, are concerned with orienting their lives

around

a

central meaning and value system would do well in their

develeducation to pay attention to their overall personal and moral

opment.

psychological
In addition, in their investigation of various

would be important
or religious systems which promise enlightment, it
system contributes to
to examine with a critical eye how well each
the individual both
the increased integration and development of

personally and socially.

one's
If one’s viewpoint is holistic, then

growth of the
spirituality, too, will contribute to the overall

individual and humankind

CHAPTER

IV

MORAL EDUCATION

Having examined some of the theoretical implications of both

moral and spiritual development, let us now examine some attempts to
apply developmental insights to education.

In the present chapter

I will focus on a cross-section of educational approaches to moral

development leaving to Chapter five a proposal for a spiritual
education curriculum.
Only those educational approaches that have

orientation will be considered here.
categories:

l)

a

developmental

These may be divided into two

those which are a direct outgrowth of and somewhat

limited to Kohlberg'

s

cognitive developmental research and, 2) those

which accept Kohlberg* s cognitive-developmental orientation but have
orientations
also drawn on other psychological (mainly humanistic)
to enrich their curricula.

represents

a

The former group of curriculum designers

somewhat ''purist" approach to cognitive developmental

seems uncomforteducation apparently shared by Kohlberg himself who
and humanisticable with attempts to wed cognitive-developmental

existential orientations in a single curriculum.

His discomfort

humanistic education "some
derives from a suspicion on his part that
of education are
times assumes not only that emotional aspects
but that spontaneou s
important aspects of the educational process,
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emotional experience and expression are educational goods or aims in
themselves” (emphasis his)

.

He contrasts this with the cognitive

developmental approach which "stresses that the cognitive reorganization of experience through successively higher levels (including

emotional experience) is the basic aim of education" (Kohlberg, 1971,
p. 74).

Other differences in approach which Kohlberg sees are an

emphasis on the here and now and the uniquely individual by the

humanists as opposed to the cognitive-developmentalists' concern for
long term and universal progressions; the humanistic emphasis on spontaneity, creativity, openness to experience and trust, he considers

just another "bag of virtues" developmentally no different than the
"Boy Scout bag" of honesty, responsibility, loyalty, self-control, etc.

Kohlberg, and presumably the developers of purely cognitive

developmental curricula, consider that the two approaches, if not
contradictory, are at least confusing when melded into
curriculum.

a

single

In contrast, some educators, whom, for want of a better

word, I will call developmental-humanistic, believe that the two

approaches are, or can be, complementary.
Kohlberg’

s

Although intrigued by

impressive theoretical structure, they consider the educa-

to
tional applications attempted by most cognitive-developmentalists

part,
be univocal, unimaginative and, for the most

simply dull.

They

approaches to
persist in the belief that any number of humanistic
virtues" but
education will not only foster the humanistic "bag of
sense of the
simultaneously will foster development in the strictest

word.

become obvious as
This is an orientation that I share as will

this chapter develops.
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A.

Cognitive Developmental Approaches to Education
1.

The Plus One Match .

When Kohl berg first performed his

research in moral development at the University of Chicago in the
middle nineteen fifties, he gave no thought to its educational appliIndeed, he doubted that his research could be applied

cations.

directly in the classroom.

However, additional experimentation by

Turiel (1965) and by Blatt (Blatt, M.

,

and Kohlberg, L., 1973)

indicated that educational interventions to raise the level of moral

judgment were possible.

It was Blatt who tested this hypothesis in

an actual classroom setting.

His first attempt was in a Jewish Sunday School near Boston

with

small class of a dozen eleven and twelve year olds.

a

He hypoth-

esized that by encouraging group discussions of moral dilemmas drawn

from the book of Genesis and of some modem dilemmas as well he could
significantly raise the classes' mean moral judgment score.

As

teacher, he was active in the discussion himself by supporting chiltheir classdren's arguments which seemed developmentally higher than
mates'

.

reached a
In addition, when the class appeared to have

Blatt would introconsensus relying on arguments from, say, Stage 3,

duce

a

contradictory argument using Stage 4 reasoning.

relying on Turiel'

s

He was

that people can
(1965) findings which indicated

level of moral thinking
understand reasoning one stage above their own
(hence the expression "plus one").

He hoped, by so doing, that the

acquisition of Stage 4 reasoning.
class would move gradually toward the
Kohlberg'

s

to the particmoral judgment test was administered

twelve-week course, as well as
ipants before and after the one hour

a
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year later.

Blatt found that the mean increase of his class from pre-

test to post-test was
stage.

statistically significant two thirds of

a

a

Expressed differently, 63$ of his students moved up one stage,

9$ moved up half a stage, and 26 % remained about the same.

Comparison

with three control groups (comprised of Turiel's experimental end two
control groups) of similar age, socio-economic background snd level of

moral development showed that changes in the latter ranged from -17 to
4-08

(e

full stage change = 100) which was not statistically significant.

A one year follow-up post-test showed

a slight,

statistically insignif-

icant decline among both experimental and control groups.

In effect,

the gains made by the Sunday School students held.
The success of this experimental teaching venture induced

Blatt to test his teaching techniques on a wider scale.

His next study

took place in the Chicago area, in the sixth and tenth grades of two

public school systems which drew on a lower middle and lower class
Blatt met with his students twice a week for

population respectively.
18, 45 minute periods.

His teaching style was the same as in the

earlier experiment j the dilemmas were new ones, of his own invention,

which highlighted specific issues used in Kohlberg’s scoring methods
such as Law, Conscience, Property, Life, etc.

Again the result was

a

as
statistically significant upward movement in moral reasoning,

dramatically as in the
measured by the Kohl berg scale, although not so

earlier experiment.
only one third of

a

was
In this case the mean score of the classes

stage higher on the post-test and only 19$

increased one full stage.

was no significant change.

there
Among 80$ of the experimental group

Among those from different socio-economic

s
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backgrounds, the sixth graders from the lower class population end the

tenth graders from the lower middle class gained the most,

mean point increase respectively.
this was so.

45 and 52

Blatt offers no explanation why

Again the changes seemed to hold in

two years later.

a

a

follow-up test done

However, although the differences between experimen-

tal and control groups are still significantly different, one inter-

esting phenomenon is that experimental group II

(a

group that had

discussed moral dilemmas among themselves with their regular teacher
present but not participating actively) had made up more than half the

difference between it and experimental group

discussion group)

.

a 12

(Blatt s guided
1

On the immediate post-test there was

difference between the two groups.
was only

I.

point difference.

a

25 point

On the two year follow-up there

One wonders if a subsequent follow-up

would show any significant difference at all between the two groups.

Of particular interest, as far as classroom technique is concerned, is Blatt'

s

Typescripts of his

highly interventive style.

discussion show him taking up approximately half the air-time.
addition his comments are often quite leading.

In

He does not merely

facilitate discussion but directs it, focusing attention on what he
thinks is important.

Here is an example from a discussion among sixth

Appendix A).
grade lower middle class students about law (Blatt, 1973,

Student

C:

Mr. B:

Student B:

It's

— there's

not a law

but—

What kind of law may be involved?
not a legal law, although it may
It'
What kind
be, it doesn't have to be.
saying
you
were
of law is it? What
she say?
did
about your mother? What
God's law.

s

,
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Mr. B:

Student

God's law.
killing?

What does it say about

Thou shalt not kill.

B:

Students B and F:

God's law is moral law

Mr. B:

What do you mean?

Student

Cause this is the laws of his country
and God has moral laws for everybody.

B:

Oh, so what you're saying is—did you
listen to what he's saying? Would you
repeat what you said? It's very

Mr. B:

important.

Student

God's law is for everyone and there's
different laws in different countries,
so God's law, his moral laws are for
everyone.

B:

Student D:

God's laws include more people than
down here, yes.

Mr. B:

Now what you're saying is that God's
laws are for all people regardless of
where you live. And so, they're
universal laws, right? They're for
the whole universe is what you're
Now you said, from
saying. All right.
the legal point of view he was right
(in refusing to lend his car to get a
seriously injured person to a hospital)
from a moral point of view he was wrong.
He had a legal right to refuse his
property but no moral right to do so.
Now what about Mr Jones? Was Mr. Jones
justified from a legal point of view
beating up the man and taking his car?

and
One gets the impression that Blatt knows where he is going

the students are being led there.

He cuts off a student in midsentence

and then focuses attention where he wants it:

what he*

saying...?

It's very important."

distinction between legal and moral,
takes the occasion to deliver

a

a

"

—did

you listen to

As students grope for the

very important insight, Blatt

mini-lecture on the distinction,
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introducing a new term "universal" in the process and then quickly

moves on to another question without stopping to see if indeed his
interpretation of what the student was saying was correct or if the
students had understood what he meant by universal laws.
In effect, in the initial attempt at a more democratic proce-

dure for teaching moral development, Blatt still betrays

authoritarian approach to the classroom.

a

rather

His opinions obviously count

for more as he exercises his authority to talk about what he considers
important,

apparently with only

a

minimal regard for whether or not

the majority of students are with him.

It seems like the new wine of

the cognitive developmental approach is still contained within the old

wineskin of an authoritarian teaching style.

Insofar as this was a

new experiment on Blatt* s part, it is certainly understandable that he
smoothly.
had difficulty making the transition from one style to another

many cognitiveVJhat is less understandable, however, is that so
protodevelopmentalists continue to revere this teaching style as

typically developmental.
Kohlberg, referring to

a

high school class participating in a

"these kids need
psychological education project, insists that,

a

virtues, to listen to people’s
course to develop the humanistic bag of

spontaneous, like they need a
feelings, to express feelings, to be

hole in the head" (Kohlberg, 1971, p. 76).

What he apparently fails to

to understand and to empathize consee is that being able to listen,

ability which Kohlberg himself
tribute directly to the role-taking

dynamics of moral development.
holds to be one of the central
that children don't need these
ness to him he is not contending

In fair-
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"virtues" but, rather, that they already possess them.

gratuitous assumption backed by no data.

But this is a

Children model adults.

Teachers who do not listen will beget students who do not listen.
The important lesson to be learned from all this is that

teachers need the skills to facilitate discussion in
ian way.

This includes not only knowing where

a

a

non-authoritar-

student may have

placed on a moral maturity test but being sensitive in the here and

now of

a

discussion to what

a

student is attempting to articulate to

self and others out of his or her experience; it includes giving stu-

dents room to arrive at their own conclusions rather than preempting
that process to illustrate one's own convictions.

Instruction may

remain as an important ingredient of moral education, even if it is

merely instruction in developmental process , but the pacing, of
instruction and the adapting of it according to the readiness of the
student to hear remains

a

crucial teaching skill to which thus far I

have seen the cognitive-developmentalists pay too little attention.

Finally movement toward

a

greater autonomy combined with

increased respect for others characteristic of democratic structures
teachers themand higher levels of moral maturity will not occur if

selves behave autocratically in their classroom.

The importance of

shortly,
this has not been missed by Kohlberg, who, as we will see

insists on the need of
and school.

a

democratic structuring of both classroom

However, he seems uncharacteristically blind to the

between teacher
importance of the quality of the personal interaction

structure will be subverted,
and student without which any democratic
refers to as the humanistic
qualities which he somewhat disparagingly

s

:

Ill

bag of virtues.

Teacher Training .

2.

Blatt attempted to teach children.

Marcia Mutterer-Mentkowski and Richard Hersh are developing curricula
to teach teachers.

To my knowledge their curriculum has not been

tested experimentally to determine whether teachers taking their

course do themselves develop.

Rather the focus in their courses has

been to teach developmental theory and to broaden the teacher's

repertoire of skills and techniques in teaching moral development.
They have developed four modules (Mentkowski and Hersh, 1975)

Module I introduces the teacher to some of the Piagetian concepts
•underlying Kohlberg's theory; Module II treats the stages of moral

development; Module III discusses procedures and techniques for

facilitating changes in moral reasoning: and Module IV considers the
moral atmosphere of the school as it relates to the creation of a
just community.

Unlike Blatt'

s

procedure with high school and younger students

and Hersh seek
which focused solely on discussing dilemmas, Mentkowski

overview of moral
to provide their teacher-candidates with both an

working in the
development theory and the practical experience of

dilemmas with their peers.
classroom and discussing their own personal
sophisticated and broader
Their approach, then, is considerably more

maturity of their students and
in scope both in light of the greater
and technique since Blatt'
of the advance in moral development theory

earlier work.
1.

They appear to work on three levels.

Their curriculum for teachers involves

cal component .

a

heavily theoreti-

to Piaget's stage
This includes extensive exposure
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theory of cognitive development (Module I); explanation of Kohlberg's

moral development theory and related research (Module II)

;

a

compari-

son of values clarification theory with moral development theory and

description of various techniques and procedures for teaching moral

development (Module III)

;

8nd an extensive explanation of the just

community concept as presently being implemented in two schools and
a prison (Module IV).

2.

The authors have attempted to integrate the theoretical

component of their course with a teacher
learning by doing.

1

s

practicum that includes

Thus for example the teachers are required to

administer Piagetian tasks concerning conservation of number, length,
area, etc., to their own students; to conduct moral dilemma discus-

sions and role-play with their students; using videotape to encourage

their students to identify classroom situations in which students or
the teacher "preach" about morality; to conduct "moral atmosphere"

interviews in the schools in which they are interning, personally
meted out,
noting how decisions are msde, by whom, how punishments are
etc.
conducting their own rule-making sessions in the classroom,

Mutterer-Mentkowski and Hersh provide no data indicating how
result of
much teacher-candidates themselves develop morally as a

approach seems to offer
their course, however their multidimensional

unidimensional approach
greater promise of overall development than a
dilemmas.
such as Blatt’s of simply discussing moral

The course

hidden agenda; the teacher,
further recommends itself because it has no
both their own development
candidates know the aim of the course is

facilitate moral development
and the acquisition of the ability to
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themselves.
There are two negative considerations however:

1)

the

construction of the curriculum suggests that the primary objective
of the course is to create competent teachers of moral development.

The emphasis in terms of time and the focus of objectives seems to
be more on facilitating growth in others than in self.

Most of the

exercises involve teacher-candidate activity in the practicum class-

room rather than interaction among themselves.

Just as counselor

education all too often primarily emphasizes the acquisition of
counseling skills in order to help the counselee without paying
sufficient attention to the counselor as a person, so there seems to
be a similar trend in many attempts at psychological education such

as Mutterer-Mentkowski and Hersh's.

If one conceives of education

as a direct transfusion of information from one body to another then

the personal presence of the teacher is of secondary importance.

however, education is conceived of as part of

a

If,

relational process

affecting both "teacher" and "student" then the quality of that
interaction becomes very important.

In psychotherapy counselor-

effectiveness depends less on the techniques used than on the counselor

1

s

ability to be present and aware of the counselee and of him

or her self in relation to the counselee in a relatively undistorted
way.

So in psychological education, teachers need not only an

evaluative awareness of their students but also an awareness of how
their own interaction with students advances or retards the educational process.

Teacher effectiveness depends less on how up-to-date

and fair the
their educational techniques are or even on how just
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organization of their classroom or school is than it does on the
people who employ the techniques and operate within the organization.

Fairness and justice, respect for the other person and tolerance must
be values they have internalized and made their own.

structure will supply for that deficiency.

No technique or

Too little of the

Mutterer-Mentkowski-Hersh curriculum is devoted to the self exploration
and self evaluation among the teacher-candidates that will enable them
to teach with awareness rather than simply employing techniques.
2)

A second criticism flows from the first.

In seeming contra

diction to what I have just said, the teacher-candidates need to learn

more group process skills

.

However they should learn these not just

as techniques but first by experiencing as learners what it is like to

have a teacher who listens to them, respects their difficulties and

frustrations as learners and paces the presentation of materials
according to their relative readiness and ability to assimilate it.
Secondly, they would reflect upon what those qualities were, how

they were employed and how they affected themselves as learners.
first on
Thirdly they would be given an opportunity to practice them,
their practicum
each other with appropriate feedback and finally in

classroom.

ability
This process helps develop a genuine role-taking

cognitive-developmentalists.
rightfully considered so important by
project oneself into another
It consists of both the ability to
reverse the process and
person’s experience and viewpoint and also to
other person’s viewpoint with a
as it were, perceive oneself from the
others.
concrete awareness of one’s own impact on

This ability,

conception of role-taking
however, differs from Selman's (1976)
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insofar as it does not rely so much on an abstract, deductive ability
to "figure out" what the other's viewpoint is as it is an on-going

process skill which utilizes awareness and finely honed intuition
fully as much as rational consciousness.

which is highly useful in itself, requires

Selman's role-taking ability
a

certain amount of

distance, emotional neutrality and time to reflect.

The process skill

I am speaking of is immediate and frequently based on feelings but

clearly differentiates between one's own feelings and viewpoint and
those of the other.

It is not empathy in the commonly understood

sense of feeling for or with someone else for one clearly distin-

guishes and cognitively affirms the distinction between one's own
position, viewpoint and feeling state and that of the other.
3.

The Just Community .

Fairly early on Kohlberg realized

that moral education within the classroom would be ineffective if it
ran counter to the morality implicitly taught through the structure
and administration of the school (the hidden curriculum)

.

Viewed

more positively he reasoned that if these two could be synchronized,
assuming that they both embodied developmental principles, then they
would become powerful tools for moral development.

A first attempt at this, as mentioned in Chapter two, was in
a

single cottage in a female correctional institution (later expanded

to include both sexes).

There, by means of regular community

meetings, prisoners were given the responsibility to determine policy
violated and
issues, to decide on disciplinary action when rules were

with
generally to administer the running of the cottage conjointly
Scharf and
the staff on a one person, one vote basis (Kohlberg,
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Hickey, 1972).
The origin of the rules whereby the cottage was run was

a

"constitutional convention" at which prisoners and staff hammered out
commonly agreed on set of rules which both would live by.

a

This was

a long and harrowing process characterized by much mistrust on both

sides.

However, it was considered crucial that all concerned should

have a say in the rules by which they would be governed.

Along with the creation of a democratic atmosphere at the
cottage and a consistent concern for a fair administration of the
rules, prisoners were also engaged in small group discussion of moral

dilemmas.

Focus soon moved from abstract dilemmas, such ss those used

by Blatt, to personal issues confronting participants both within the

prison and "in the street."

Unlike the former, these personal dilemmas

generated considerable feeling among the participants.

During a visit

to the cottage I observed a very heated discussion about the right of

prisoners to have sexual relations with each other (the cottage was in
the early stages of forming a community comprised of both sexes)

.

The

issue appeared unresolvable on the cottage level since a general

prison rule forbade sexual contact among prisoners.
Scharf (1974) reports that early results indicated that the
about one third of
mean moral maturity scores of the prisoners rose

a

points) that of an oral
stage (39 points) a little more than twice (17

discussion group not involved in the cottage democracy.

Two other

woman's prison, -2
control groups showed almost no change (control
point; control men's prison + 2 points).

About one half of the

released from prison and about a
original experimental group had been

.
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year later there had been no recidivism (Kohlberg, Scharf and Hickey,
1972)

Subsequently Kohlberg and co-workers applied the moral atmosphere principle to the establishment of "experimental just schools"
in Massachusetts and California.

The Cambridge, Massachusetts school began with 60 students
and 7 teachers.

Its curriculum focuses on social science and math.

Students attend regular high schools for the remainder of their
courses.

Like the prison community, students and staff drew up a

governing constitution.

Compulsory weekly community meetings are

held to discuss proposals which are implemented by a simple majority
vote.

There are, in addition small group sessions that prepare

proposals for the larger community meetings, including disciplinary

procedures for rule-breakers, new policies, etc.

Other small groups

provide counseling, staff training and mini-courses.
The Irvine, California school consists of 7 teachers and

200 students.

Coursework focuses on interdisciplinary studies and

frequently involves fieldwork in some sort of community education
project.

in
There are three levels of formalized social interaction

the school.

Small interpersonal groups meet daily.

From these groups

elected to a representative
and from the school at-large, students are

council which has disciplinary authority.

Regularly held community

representative council
meetings can override decisions made by the

(Mutterer-Mentkowski and Hersh, 1975).
curriculum of the two schools
A difference in organization and
students' focus of attention.
creates a slight difference in the
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Because of their involvement in field work, the Irvine students found

themselves confronted with moral dilemmas in the world outside the
school.

The Cambridge students, on the other hand, found their moral

dilemmas in the actual running of their own school.

Again statistics concerning the growth of the students in these
experimental schools are not available at this writing.

One would

expect, however, at least as great an upward movement as in the prison-

experiment reported earlier.

All these attempts to restructure the

learning environment so that it embodies as nearly as possible the
just community talked about in moral discussions, and provides multiple

role-taking opportunities in real life situations, represent a real
advance over the "canned discussion" formula of earlier attempts at

moral education.

Justice and the problems inherent in administering it

need to be experienced on

a

first-hand basis, not simply talked about.

It follows then, that teachers committed to moral education need,

along with familiarity with moral theory, an ability to plan and

perhaps to moderate the constitutional process whereby
tional institution sets

a

system of justice in motion.

profitably look at the procedures followed by
to learn some of these skills.

a

a

given educa-

Teachers might

town-meeting moderator

In addition they would need what

students of group dynamics call "process skills."

In general, these

climate of
consist of an ability to monitor the interpersonal

a

given

where the genuine interest and
group, to determine its emotional tone,
blocked or dissipated and
energy of the group lies, where it is being
group to issues they may be
how, and to call the attention of the

accomplishment of their goals.
avoiding which may be subverting the
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In short, the skilled process person maintains a delicate balance

between the human processes activated by any group meeting and the

overt goal or agenda of that meeting and he or she attempts to teach
the same skill to the participants.

My impressionistic observation of the cognitive-developmentalists both as they met among themselves at a 1974 conference and as
an observer of the just community prison was that most of their process

skills were procedural a la Robert*

personal.

s

Rule of Order rather than

At both meetings feelings ran high among participants and in

neither case were they explicitly acknowledged.

Rather, repeated

attempts were made to maintain discussion at a "problem-sol ving*' cognitive level, attempts which bogged down because of a growing backlog of

unattended feelings.

In the latter instance, while the group leaders

avoided some of the emotional excesses that some Synanon type thera-

peutic communities fall prey to, they seemed at the same time somewhat
bewildered by the raw feelings of the prisoners and unsure about how
to deal with them.

Hersh
In this instance as with the Mutter er-Mentkowski and

curriculum, more emphasis needs to be placed on teacher formation.

There is no such thing as

implement it.

a good

curriculum without a good teacher to

material
And good teachers need not only to master the

it.
but also the very human process of teaching
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B.

Humanistic-Developmental Approaches to Education
1.

Deliberate Psychological Education .

The educational goal

of Deliberate Psychological Education is "to make personal development
a central focus of education..." (Mosher and Sprinthall, 1971).

Sprinthall, Mosher and other proponents of this approach draw heavily
on cognitive-developmental psychology for their theoretical orienta-

tion to education; however, their actual teaching practice more

closely resembles
Maslow.

a

humanistic approach in the tradition of Rogers and

They have hypothesized that by teaching high school students

counseling skills and involving them in

counseling practicum, they

a

could raise the latter s’ developmental level as measured by the

Kohl berg and Loevinger scales.

For Sprinthall and Mosher, the course

content is less important than the impact on the students' overall
growth and development.

They arrived at this conclusion from their

own experience (Mosher and Sprinthall, 1971, pp. 15-16):

Having taught counselor education at the graduate level for
seven years, we realized that the seminar and practicum
experiences in counseling were powerful tools for raising
questions of personal identity, the meaning of a helping
relationship, understanding one's self and others in
comprehensive ways, the complexity of hearing and responding
importance of
to another person's ideas and feelings, the
the impact
that
question
little
emotions etc. ...There is
can
supervision
and
of such experiences in counseling
hopefully,
(and
promote personal growth for the counselor
too, for the client).
see development as
Thus, with Kohl berg and Mayer (1972) they

stages) but also conten t
not only structural (through successive

interpersonal shills
oriented (through the acquisition of better
respond appropriately).
such as the ability to listen and to

out
authors' goal then was not to turn

a

whole bevy of junior

The
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counselors but to stimulate personal development.

Mosher and Sprinthall's first attempt at psychological education was at a public high school in Newton, Massachusetts.

They

offered a course in counseling, one of several electives in psychology

from which students could choose.

Since more than 800 of the school's

1700 population had elected courses in psychology, 24 students were

randomly assigned to the experimental group and 24 to a control.
Both groups were pre and post-tested using the Kohlberg moral develop-

ment and the Loevinger ego development scales.
The format of the counseling course consisted of three phases.
In phase one (which lasted six weeks) students engaged in role-play

counseling.

They alternated playing the role of counselor and client,

tape recording the proceedings.

Once a week they met as a class for

three hours with the instructors to play and critique the tapes.
Phase two involved an unplanned shift.

As students became

more comfortable with each other, they stopped making up issues to

discuss and began sharing real-life problems with each other .

The

instructors feared that this unplanned phase might initiate "an

unending orgy of self—reference" but instead they "found the students
swinging back and forth between their own internal frame of reference
and the frame of reference of others" (Mosher and Sprinthall, 1971,
p. 25).

During this phase students were able to articulate some of

often for the
their uniquely adolescent problems to sympathetic peers,

first time.

she had
In a class discussion of a practicum in which

her own and her
played the role of counselor, one student articulated
peers'

feelings, (Ibid

. ,

p. 25)?

,
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I just feel there are so many changes going on within me
and there are so many changes going on within kids my age,
you know, and I can't find this stabilizing thing, you
know.
It’s just like shifting and moving and it'll settle
down, you know; but at this point, it's just so scary, it's
so drifting and lost, you know.

In the third phase the students began to counsel other

students in the high school.

This was worked out through the guid-

ance department, who let it be known that some high school seniors
had taken a special program in counseling and were available, under
supervision, to talk with juniors who might have questions or concerns

about college, job choices, senior course selection or other decisions.
Class work during this phase consisted in reviewing tapes of actual
sessions as had been done during the earlier phases.

Issues discussed

during this time included confidentiality, confrontation versus clarifying responses and avoiding "phony encouragement" and "put downs."

Post-tests administered at the end of the one semester course
indicated a l/3 stage change (from 3.22 to 3.56) on the Kohlberg scale.
Of the 18 students taking the post-test, seven moved upward on the
scale, nine remained the same and two regressed.

from Stage three, (the modal stage) to Stage four.

Most movement was
The overall upward

significant
movement, however, while suggestive, was statistically

only at the .08 level.

There was no change in the control group.

scores
For the Loevinger ego development pre and post-test

experimental group mean
there was a significant upward movement of the

from delta 3 to 3/4.

The former stage is characterized as "wary

former as "conscienself-protective, opportunistic conformism;" the
and conceptual complextious concern for communication, self-respect

ity."

throughout the semester.
The control group remained at delta /3
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Several other variations of the Deliberate Psychological

Education model have been attempted.

Atkins (Mosher and Sprinthall,

1971) reports on the use of high school students to teach elementary

school students with teacher supervision.

The high school students

met weekly to discuss assigned readings in education and group-process
skills and to share their experiences in the teaching practicum.
The pre and post-test results were ambiguous.

The Kohlberg

test showed a non-significant -4 stage increase while the Loevinger
-

test showed a slight decrease in the post test

—not

an uncommon phenom-

enon as Loevinger herself has reported.

Still other variations were the teaching of improvisational
drama, a course in child development, including a practicum in

nursery and peer counseling in the inner city .

a

None of these provided

developmental test data at the time of publication (1971)

•

They repre-

sented, however, imaginative approaches to psychological education.

Sprinthall and Erickson, (1974) have continued similar experiapproximately the
ments in the Minneapolis public school system with
same results.

about
In a course called "The Psychology of Counseling"

counseling described
the same syllabus was followed as in the course in

above.

active-listening
The students were taught the five point

and viewed the Gloria
scale, were assigned readings in communications

counseling segments by
films ("Three Approaches to Psychotherapy")
Rogers, Peris end Ellis.

with
In addition they practiced counseling

on real rather than roleeach other which, as before, soon focused

played problems.
upward movement on the two
The authors assert that there was an

•
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developmental scales employed but do not specify results.
more specific about a women'
sophomore girls.

s

They are

study course offered to high school

The students were taught listening and interviewing

skills prior to their field work which partially consisted of inter-

viewing women across the life span.

In role-play situations they

learned how to ask Piaget type interview questions to gather data
In addition, in seminar meetings, they were

from their interviews.

taught to analyze responses according to developmental criteria such
as complexity of thought, differentiated feeling statements, etc.

To supplement the live interviews the students also studied women in

literature and from a developmental viewpoint examined such personalities as the 16 year old eponymous heroine of Sophocles' Antigone

Nora in Ibsen's A Doll

Shrew

,

'

s

House

,

,

and Katherine in The Taming of the

etc.

Post-test results indicated

a

statistically significant upward

movement on the Loevinger scale from Stage

3

(conformist) and Stage

toward Stage 4
3/4 (transition from conformist to conscientious)

(conscientious and even to Stage 4/5 transition toward autonomous)
berg scale was
As in the other studies,’ the post-test using the Kohl

less impressive.

There was approximately a l/3 stage increase, from

was significant,
Stage 3 toward Stage 4, of the group mean, which

however, only at the .07 level.

A control group composed of students

change in either
from regular high school classes evidenced no

Loevinger or Kohl berg scores.
and the
The difference in results between the Kohlberg

things.
Loevinger tests may be attributable to two

First, the course
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content in several of these projects appears to focus on the more
generic concept of ego development than on moral development.

Listening for greater conceptual complexity, clearer articulation of
feelings etc., more closely resembles Loevinger's stage descriptions
than Kohlberg s.
1

Secondly, Kohlberg (1976) continues to insist that

ego and moral stages are distinct.

He asserts that, "to treat moral

development as simply a facet of ego. .development is to miss many
.

of its special problems and features.

..

.The higher the moral stage,

the more distinct it is from the parallel ego stage" (Kohlberg, 1976,
p. 53).

Hence, at least up to

possible without

a

a

point, ego development may be

concomitant growth in moral development.

Deliberate Psychological Education represents an interesting
and, to my mind, encouraging shift in emphasis when compared with the
It has

other attempts at developmental education outlined thus far.

focused on the growth of the potential teacher as its primary goal

rather than on imparting skills.

This is not to imply that skill

development was ignored or even minimized.

Various measures not

reported here, such as those developed by Carkhuff, (1971) indicated
real counseling skill acquisition.

various courses remained:
pants.

However, the purpose of the

to foster the development of the partici-

this
The various authors do not discuss whether they think

fac to
approach is appropriate only on the high school level where de

goal of teacher
their focus was or whether this should indeed be the

graduate level.
and counselor education on the college and

that it would indeed be appropriate.

I

contend

It is the development of the

her effective.
whole teacher or counselor that makes him or

The
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beauty of the deliberate psychological education approach is that it

demonstrates that fostering development and teaching skills need not
be mutually exclusive educational objectives.

In fact, at least in

education for human services, the two are complementary.

The D.P.E.

approach, however, does leave some doubt as to its effectiveness in

fostering moral development.

Perhaps a more explicit focus on this

facet of development than has thus far been attempted is required.
2.

Confluent Moral Education .

Picetti and Au, (1974) have

borrowed the expression confluent education from George I. Brown,
(1971) for their approach to moral education.

They have not presented

a curriculum as such but rather a series of suggestions as to the

areas on which a curriculum should focus.

They criticize many moral

educators, especially the contributors to the Toronto Conference on

moral education (Beck, Crittenden and Sullivan, 1971) for, "an obvious,

disproportionate focus on the cognitive/rational components of moral
behavior with the unfortunate consequence of neglecting an in-depth

discussion of the affective dimensions of moral behavior" (Picetti and
Au, 1974, p. 16).

In attempting to remedy the deficit they draw not

only on the work of Brown, (1971) but also on that of May, (1969),
Wilson,

(1969), Peris,
I

(1972) and Assagioli,

(1971).

them
will mention, only in passing, several areas treated by

in which more attention might fruitfully be focused.

Unconscious motivation .

Following Gustafson, (1970)

,

they

’real' determinants
define as unconscious motivation "those presumably

different from the reasons we
of behavior which underlie and often are
19).
give for our actions" (Picetti and Au, 1974, p.

The authors
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suggest that it is not within the purview of education to attempt to

delve deep into the unconscious.

However, there is an unconscious

"layer" that is phenomenologically nearer the surface of consciousness

which can be profitably mined by education.

The Gestalt awareness

continuum, the guided fantasies of psychosynthesis, artwork, roleplays, dance, to name but a few means, can raise to the level of

awareness aspects of our personalities including half-realized needs,
goals and desires of which we were previously unaware.

Greater aware-

ness brings with it greater freedom and responsibility (i.e., the
ability to respond) and expands the moral dimension of our lives.

Greater awareness moves naturally from the level of cognition to the
level of conation and bridges to some extent the artificial dichotomy

sometimes set up between the two.

Rollo May's, (1969)

phenomenologists
this.

'

,

somewhat popular explanation of the

concept of intentionality attempts to conceptualize

Intentionality refers to the natural appetite of the human mind

that carries it toward Being.

Knowing something is not merely

beholding it statically from afar; the act of knowing causes us to

enter into relationship with the objects of our knowledge.

We are

inclined in their direction— hence the "knowing" of the bible refers
to sexual intercourse.

Intentionality then is not only the dynamism

the
of knowing as originally defined by the phenomenologists but also

dynamism of action and includes the latter in its very definition.
However, "intending" something is not merely a conscious,

intellectual function.

The conscious and unconscious aspects of our

spontaneous
personalities are possessed of their own dynamisms and
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"intentions," often in conflict with one another.

One of the goals

of a moral education of the "unconscious" could be to assist the

student to bring these various dynamisms into fuller awareness

— to

"befriend" the inner world, as Picetti and Au happily express it
(p. 61)

— in

order to utilize the energy latent in them.

The tech-

niques of Gestalt Therapy are particularly well suited to help

mediate the often-conflicting claims and values of the many polarities in our personalities once they are raised to awareness and to

unify and direct our psychic energy system toward our self-chosen
goals.

Belief is another relatively unexplored aspect of moral education.

The authors use Ausubel's definition of belief as "a genuine

conviction, a disposition to behave in

a

certain way that is consonant

with underlying thought and feeling" (Ausubel, 1971,

p. 212).

Genuine

belief involves emotional and intellectual conviction and thus has a

large affective component.

Many beliefs, of course, are unexamined

and frequently we are unaware of their influence on our actions.

These can range from

a

belief, perhaps inherited from childhood experi-

ences, that the world will never supply our material and emotional

needs to a belief in an all-loving God.

If either is a genuinely held

moral crises. The
belief it will certainly influence the way we act in
even against
former may cause one to act with "immoral" selfishness

one's own conscience or moral judgment.

The latter too may stimulate

of thought.
action that does not fit "normal" moral categories

One

some of the thought
can also see that this category parallels somewhat

already outlined in Chapter three.

A spirituality always involves

a
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set of convictions which are not always logically defensible (though

they may be) and include

a

profound affective component.

A moral education, then, that explores beliefs will have to
find

a

way of reconciling beliefs as they affect our actions and our

personal moral philosophies.

Insofar as beliefs are unconscious or

unexamined they will have to be brought into awareness, not necessarily for cold, intellectual analysis but in vivo

,

with their affect

intact to see how they interact with, corroborate, or contradict our

more "rational" (so we think) moral philosophies.
There are several means for dealing with both unconscious

motivations and beliefs.

Assagioli, (1971), for example, outlines

six stages of the will (no relation to Kohlberg's stages) and
related techniques which, he claims aids in the explication snd inte-

gration of our unconscious motives, desires and beliefs into

comprehensive lived value system.
the unconscious and

a

a

He begins with an exploration of

deliberate valuing of its contents; a decision

process follows, based on

a

clearer concept of one's values and a

realization that choosing frequently means excluding some things of

relatively less value; based on one's faith or conviction one then
affirms that one's choice is worthwhile and valuable; one next plans
forethe execution of one's choice which involves pre-visualizing,

direction of
seeing intermediate steps, etc; the final step is the

execution which requires energy and persistence.
unconscious
As one becomes increasingly more aware of one's
it is
motivations and beliefs and explores their implications,

moke sense out of
extremely helpful to have a structure or system to
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them.

On

a

theoretical-cognitive level, a knowledge of Kohlberg's

stages could help one identify and locate some of the moral elements.

On

a

more personal level the use of the Trumpet developed by Gerald

Weinstein (Weinstein and Fantini, 1970; Weinstein, 1973) provides

a

systematic process to enable one to inventory and explore the effects
of a given belief or motivation on oneself, to explore and evaluate

alternatives with
trumpet provides

a
a

view to making self-aware choices.

Weinstein's

more systematic way of deciding than does Assagioli

and could profitably be integrated with the latter's "will theory."

Kohlberg's "plus one match" approach could also be used with the
trumpet when considering alternatives.

In such a case, the teacher or

facilitator would not only ask clarifying questions to assist the
learner to generate alternatives, but also would pose moral considerations (when appropriate) and on occasion challenge the learner's

thinking from a higher developmental level.

Picetti and Au then broaden the area of moral consideration to
embrace conative, affective and unconscious elements of the person-

ality more than any of the systems reviewed so far.

They continue to

respect the cognitive-developmental approach to moral education but
are aware of its limitations and attempt to remedy them.

They use

a

their
shot gun approach, however, and give little indication how

suggestions might be incorporated systematically into a curriculum.
3.

An Experiment in Moral Education .

A final example of an

with a humanattempt to combine the cognitive-developmental approach
John Piwko (1975),
istic orientation is an experimental class which

men and women at a small
and I taught to a group of first year college

;
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midwestern Catholic college.

Unlike Mosher and Sprinthall, our course

focused directly on the teaching of moral development.

were participants in

a

in Human Development.

Our students

human development program entitled Basic Seminar
As part of their curriculum they attended twice

weekly "support groups" facilitated by graduate students working under
staff supervision during which the students were encouraged to discuss

whatever personal issues the college experience was creating for them.
Piwko and I theorized that, as important as these groups were, they
alone were insufficient to stimulate moral development.

undertook to design

a moral

We therefore

development "seminar" consisting of ten

two-hour seminars which would utilize

small group format, but which

a

would also consist of structured experiences as well as the presentation of moral development theory.

We wanted to combine an objective,

content orientation with an invitation to explore some of the students'

personal feelings around such areas as guilt, duty to parents and
authority, peer pressure, etc.

We thus hoped to overcome the dichotomy

between thinking and feeling that has afflicted moral education.

We

felt justified in attempting this somewhat risky undertaking because
the students were accustomed to "dealing with feelings" in their

support groups.
To test our hypothesis we offered our course to Basic Seminar

students as an elective on a first-come basis.
dents.

We accepted 15 stu-

We formed two control groups, one consisting of 15 Basic

Seminar students chosen randomly from

a

pool of 30 (control group l)

from a regular
the other (control group 2) consisted of 15 students

Seminar students.
freshman psychology course, none of whom were Basic
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All three groups took the Defining Issues Test of Moral

Judgment (DIT) developed by James Rest (1974, 1975), an objective
test of moral judgment based on Kohlberg.

dilemma stories.

The DIT consists of six

Using a Likert- type scale, subjects are asked to

evaluate the importance of 12 issue-statements for each story in
of their relative importance in resolving the dilemma.

terras

They then rank

what they believe to be the four most important issue-statements.

The

DIT yields a "P" or principled score which can be expressed as a
percentage ranging from zero to 95.

The "P" score expresses what

weight the subject attributes to principled issue-statements (statements expressing Stage

5

end 6 thinking) in resolving the dilemmas.

The DIT, therefore, does not yield a stage score but only indicates

what importance subjects attribute to principled thinking.

It is

based on the assumption that Stage 2 subjects, for example, will give

less weight to principled thinking than Stage

3

subjects less weight than Stage 4 subjects, etc.

subjects, Stage 3

An increase in the

"P" score of a subject would imply developmental movement toward

principled thinking.
All three groups were re-tested upon completion of the seminar.

Since an equivalent forms version of the DIT was not available

at the time, the same version was used as on the pre-test.

was done by

a

Scoring

computer.

The actual conducting of the seminar can perhaps best be

described according to the somewhat artificial distinction between
structure and content.
small
The structure of the seminar was thst of a modified
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group.

The atmosphere was relaxed.

Except when films were shown,

teachers and students sat on the floor or used cushions in

room where group sessions were frequently held.

a

small

Free interchanges

between teachers and students took place and students were encouraged
to express their feelings as well as their ideas, a function which

the teachers attempted to model.

In regular evaluation sessions held

throughout the duration of the seminar students were also encouraged
to express their needs and expectations.

Although the teachers had

drawn up a preliminary outline of the course content, adjustments
were continually made on the basis of the on-going evaluation process.
The teachers found that they tended to present more theoretical mate-

rial than the students could assimilate at one time.

In general the

latter requested more time to digest the material and to relate it to
their own experience.
The students took part with relative alacrity in relaxation

exercises and discussions.

The ease with which they did this is at

least partly attributable to approximately two months' prior experience in small groups which they had been motivated enough to elect.
college
In this regard they were probably not typical first-year

students.

Piwko and I hope, however, that some of the enthusiasm

be attributed
with which the students participated in the seminar can
so that participants
to the care taken in structuring the seminar

feelings.
were listened to and encouraged to express their

They

response to their feedalso saw that changes were made in format in
back.

presentation of
The course content focused on (a) the

s

.
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developmental theory, (b) the presentation of some social issues in
the light of developmental theory, and (c) exploration of personal

reactions and feelings to moral issues.

A format followed in most

of the seminar was the exposure to an experience, e.g.,

a

film or an

exercise; the processing of the experience (what did you think? feel?
do?) and a recording of the reactions in

a

notebook; snd a mixture of

theory snd discussion to make some sense out of the experience.
example, in session 8,

Seasons was shown.

a

For

half hour condensed version of A Man for All

Students were then asked to discuss and record in

their journals their personal reactions to the film.

In addition

they were asked to reflect on their own lives to see if there were
values they would put their lives on the line for.

Finally, on

a

more

theoretical basis, they were asked to estimate what stage of moral

thinking several different characters in the film seemed to be acting

from (by this time Kohlberg

1

s

stage theory had been discussed in some

detail)
The presentation of developmental theory included a discussion
of the various ways of teaching morality as discussed in the first

chapter.

Also included was an explanation of Kohlberg

1

s

stage theory.

Opportunity was provided to discuss and role-play moral dilemmas.
Some of the social issues explored derived from Milgram'
authority.
(1974), experiments regarding obedience to

An exploration

Nazi concentration
of racism was initiated by viewing a film on the
among the
camps and led to a self assessment of racial attitudes

seminar participants themselves.

Attitudes regarding violence, its

investigated as
acceptance and portrayal in society, were

a

result
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of an out-of-class assignment to view A Clockwork Oranre which was

showing on campus at the time.
In all these presentations and discussions the students were

brought back to reflect on their own attitudes, feelings and values.
This exploration of personal feelings and reactions was fostered

through regular journal entries during and after class time, through

discussion and confrontation of differing viewpoints among participants and by structured exercises.
One such exercise involved a guided fantasy during which the

students were asked to allow an image to form at the mention of the

word "conscience."

One student describes his experience:

I opened my vision with only a yellow background.
Across this background moved a dark object too fuzzy
Slowly, this object moved in my
to be deciphered.
general direction till it finally stopped only a short
distance from me. It was nothing but a big, blsck,
jagged rock out of which resounded a nonsensical voice.
I stood there in its shadow staring at it in a defiant
manner, while it appears to examine me. .. .Shortly thereafter the image faded into a dark background and the
fantasy ended. Little need be said regarding how I
apparently feel toward my top dog (conscience). Defiance
sums it up well.

A better representation of conscience as alien and heteron-

omous could scarcely be imagined.

The student, an eager learner,

pleasant and almost too agreeable, in other words well-socialized,
wanted
was getting in touch with the suppressed part of himself that
only gibberish to
to defy the conventions which at some level speak
him.

probably score at
It appears that, although the student would

persists an unsocialthe conventional level on Kohlberg's scale, there

Neumann speak, in revolt
ized residue, the "shadow" of which Jung and

against social convention and being a "good boy."
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In another fantasy exploring the source of their moral

injunctions students imagined:
Jesus saying "relax,"

a

a

first grade nun waggling her finger,

woman intervening to stop one man from stabbing

another, a crowd of friends and a young man named "Be Moral" trying
in

vain to get their attention.

As time permitted, students role-plsyed

the various parts of their fantasies to identify and explore them

further.

Their final report on the seminar indicated that many of them

sensed the splits in themselves both between the moral set they had
been raised to follow and were now questioning, and between idealized

actions they presently envisioned and their ability to implement them.
As one student wrote pithily:

"Somehow it seems easier to 'die

cause than to 'have one's head cut off' for

a

cause.

1

for

a

Somehow it seems

easier to say you will do one than the other, even though they are
both the same."
The results of the post-test indicated that the experimental

group has increased its "P" score by 8.05$, from 44.72$ to 52.77$

which was significant at the .05 level.

Control group one, students in

the Basic Seminar in Human Development but not participants in the

moral development seminar, increased 1.53$ from 45.55$ to 47.08$.
Control group two, students in
.83$ from 39.44$ to 38.61$.

a

first-year psychology class decreased

In neither control group was the change

significant.#
The seminar raised more issues than it solved.

In written

and oral feedback at its conclusion, the majority of participants

expressed regret that the seminar was over.

They especially wanted to

#For further statistical analysis see Piwko, 1974, or
in Appendix.

summary
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explore more personal moral issues.

As

a

result

a

organized which focused on personal moral issues.

not included in our statistical study.

second seminar was

This seminar was

Its format W8S less formal

than the first but generally followed the formula of providing

stimulating event, usually

a

a

structured exercise, followed by an oppor-

tunity to process what each participant experienced during the event.
Finally, individuals volunteered or requested time to explore an issue
that the initial stimulus or an occurrence outside had touched off.
The dividing line between this seminar and

very thin.
11

a

therapy group is

The main difference was that the participants came to the

seminar" with

a

theoretical orientation in moral development from

the first seminar and that they worked on issues that had specifically

moral implications for them.

A year and a half later

a

follow-up questionnaire was sent to

all participants in the moral development seminar to determine what

effect, if any, the seminar had had on their every day lives.

six of the fifteen participants replied.

Only

Reactions varied— four

reported that when it came to making moral decisions they believed
that they were more aware of the importance of following their own

judgment and experience over against just doing what

a

rule dictates.

As one put it:

do not place such an emphasis on rules. I tried to
I take the situation that I am in
see beyond rules.
as a special circumstance.
I

Another said that the course "at first made me very bitter—
"values" and "morals.
it made me challenge a lot of my so-called
an
Another said that the seminar enabled him to balance

.
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objective appraisal of a situation against the "human element"
involved

From these replies, as well as from the self-reports submitted
at the end of the course, there is little doubt that the course

genuinely affected the participants' thinking, influencing them in
the direction of greater flexibility and tolerance of ambiguity.

Evidence however, that the seminar had
actions is much more ambiguous.

a

direct influence on moral

Two of the six students who replied

listed several activities (fasting from one meal to donate the

proceeds to Guatemalan earthquake victims, working with the mentally
retarded, etc.) in which they became involved subsequent to the course
but these, of course, cannot be attributed directly to the seminar

itself.

Two others expressed doubt that the seminar influenced their

subsequent actions at all.

All six respondents, on the other hand,

believe that in one way or another the seminar (some times combined

with other experiences) has influenced the way they relate to other
people.

Most make such comments as "putting myself in another's

shoes" more often, being more accepting of others' ideas, standing up

for one's own beliefs more, etc.

One student remarks that she feels

more negatively about people but is unsure if that is as
the seminar or

a result of

not'.

anecdotal,
Though these replies cannot be considered more than

they suggest that the seminar did have

a

positive impact on the

thinking and attitudes of the participants.

However, they also suggest

comprehensive approach is
that in order to affect moral actions a more

required than a single course offering.
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Conclusion .

It is apparent from this brief overview of

moral education that many innovations have occurred since
Blatt's

work in a Jewish Sunday School.

It also appears that developmental

and humanistic approaches to education can work hand-in-hand to

produce involving and effective curricula.
is teacher-proof.

No curriculum, however,

A common variable of all the studies reviewed here

is that all the courses were taught by highly skilled teachers.

Concomitant, then, with the development of curricula should be compre-

hensive training of teachers.

In the chapter that follows I will

outline a teacher training program which will include the salient

features of the best attempts at developmental education.

In line

with the overall orientation of this work I will endeavor to include
a segment on spirituality as well.

CHAPTER

V

A DEVELOPMENTAL CURRICULUM FOR TEACHERS

In Chapter four I reviewed some of the attempts to design

developmental curricula.

I observed that with the exception of that

of Mentkowski-Hersh, all the curricula were aimed at young people.
It was apparently assumed that the teachers themselves possessed the

requisite skills to teach development successfully.

certain logic in this.

There is a

In the design of an experimental curriculum

one naturally focuses on the people one wishes to teach rather than
'

oneself, the teacher.

However, as in physics, one must ultimately

consider the effect of the observer on the thing observed; even more
so in teaching one must be cognizant of the impact of the teacher in

the classroom.

The quality of the teacher-student interaction will

depend a great deal on the personality and formation of the teacher.
It does not seem unreasonable to assume that the level of development

of the teacher will serve as

a

limit to the potential development of

the student.
for
In this final chapter, then, I outline a curriculum

teachers aimed at fostering their own development.

from Mentkowski and Hersh,

In this, it differs

It resembles theirs in that it does not

designed to impart
rest content with fostering development; it is also

development of
specific teaching skills which in turn will aid the
140

.
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students.

Research in Deliberate Psychological Education indicates

that teaching certain skills in itself facilitates the development
of the learner.

Goal o f the Curriculum .

The goal of the developmental curric-

ulum for teachers, then, is twofold.

First, it is to facilitate the

holistic development of teachers so that they, in turn, will more

effectively aid the development of their students.

Two of the pri-

mary foci of this first goal are moral and spiritual value development.
The second goal is to equip teachers with the knowledge,
skills and techniques to foster development in others.

Research supports the contention that short-term interventions
seldom have long-term effects.
extend over

a

This curriculum, therefore, would

fairly long period of time

(a

minimum of two years)

Preferably the several modules envisioned would be interspersed
throughout a long-term teacher-training program.

It would be impor-

tant however, that all the modules be integrated under a comprehensive

viewpoint so that each would contribute in its own way to overall
development.

Method
The method would proceed along three fronts.

necessarily in chronological order)
and cognitive skills.

,

First (not

would be the teaching of theory

Students, for example, would familiarize them-

selves with Piaget's stage theory of cognitive development.

They

would do so both by reading and lecture but also more experiential ly
and adminisby experimenting with some of Piaget's learning tasks

tering them to others.

Secondly students would be involved in

H2
"laboratory” or personal growth experiences.

They would wrestle with

Kohlbergian moral dilemmas themselves; they would struggle with the

practical problems and frustrations of a "constitutional convention"
to develop guidelines for their own learning community; they would

meet in small support groups and develop process skills with each
other before attempting to assume a teacher’s role with others.

Thirdly they would be involved in practicum experiences.

Like Mosher and Sprinthall’s students they might do supervised counseling to develop further their process skills; they might intern at
a "just school" or alternate between participating 8nd/or observing
a "just prison community" model and a "therapeutic community" model

to compare the two.

Ideally the students would be continuously reinforcing experience with cognitive constructs, and adapting cognitive constructs to

match their experience in a progressive spiral of assimilation and
accommodation.

Keeping in mind the overall goals of the curriculum and that
these three teaching orientations would be employed throughout, let

us now survey several essential modules of a comprehensive develop-

mental curriculum.
1.

Developmental Theory .

This module would familiarize

students with some of the developmental theories.

These would

include:

Piaget’s cognitive stage theory,
Kohl berg'

s

"Stage 7."

moral stage theory, including his

raeta

ethical
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Loevinger's ego stage theory,

Erikson's psychosocial stage theory.
As mentioned earlier, students would be expected not only to
be able to describe the various developmental theories but also to

perform some of the cognitive tasks associated with them.

They may

for example, generate responses prototypical of given stages,

construct dilemmas highlighting certain issues in moral development,
analyze and score the responses to various developmental problems,
or examine their own lives, via structured exercises, to determine

developmental issues they are presently confronting, etc.
2.

The "Just Community

11

.

Included here would be an exami-

nation of the social structures which promote justice particularly
in a learning community.

A Theory of Justice by John Rawls (1971),

might serve as a theoretical base but an historical review of
various attempts to found humane societies from the Greek city state

down to the latest adventures in communal living would also be
advantageous.
On the experiential level, students would be included in the

governing of their own learning community according to the principles
of justice.

In addition, they would be provided an opportunity to

practicum
observe and to analyze other social environments through

assignments and the use of Kohlberg's Moral A tmosphere Interview.
3.

Process Skills and Their Application to Teaching .

This

sequence because
module ought to be taught early in the curriculum

virtually every stage
process skills can be employed effectively at

while interviewing,
of the teaching-learning cycle particularly
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leading discussions, during community meetings, etc.

This is also

the area that nearly all moral development curriculum designers overlook.

Process refers to the ebb and flow of awarenesses, feelings
8nd actions which characterize any human interaction.

It is usually

distinguished from the overt agenda or "content" of the same interaction, e.g., discussing an amendment to a motion, teaching the forms

of irregular Greek verbs, talking about my relationship with my wife.

Unless otherwise directed, most of our attention focuses on the
content.

Yet the energy and dynamism of human interactions derives

from the process.

Process skills enable a teacher to monitor the

flow of an interchange, identify blocks, and periodically to focus
the awareness of participants on what is helping or hindering the

completion of their agenda.

In addition to logical processes, the

skilled process person respects feelings and emotions and knows how
to utilize the energy of the latter constructively.

One of the most common complaints about moral development
On

theory is its inability to integrate affect into its structure.

a practical level this is reflected in exclusively content-oriented

teaching styles.

This module, therefore, is included as a partial

remedy for this lack.

George Brown*

s

Human Teaching for Human Learning (1971)

,

is

process and
one of the better books for suggestions on how to blend

content into one*s teaching style.

Wyatt (1972), has outlined a

course in process skills which, like Mosher and Sprinthall*

s,

learners from the very beginning in an experiential fashion.

involves
Her
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course, however, unlike the other authors, focuses on process in an

almost chemically pure way.

Students learn how to be aware of five

basic process events while interacting with each other.

They have

the opportunity to focus awareness on these events so that they can

experience the frequently dramatic outcomes of a shift in focus from
content to process.
The final step of this module would be enabling students to

use their process skills in a practicum setting and to receive feedback on their effectiveness.

An alternative would be to rotate group

leadership in a group of peers and to receive feedback from them.
4.

Infra-Rational Value Sources

.

Cognitive-developmentalists

continue to over-simplify the influence of cognitive processes on a

person's actions.

Contrary to the platonists' contention, to know

the good is not necessarily to do it.

This module would acquaint the

prospective teacher with some psychological attempts to explain, from
below as it were, the gap between knowing and doing.

Beginning with

Freud's explanation of the development of the superego or conscience,
it would explore Jung'

s

and Neumann'

s

theory of socialization and the

development of the shadow and the persona and the integration of
conscious and unconscious processes in the self

.

In addition it would

survey more recent conceptualizations of non— rational motivating
Child; and
forces and complexes such as Berne's Parent, Adult, and

characters.
Perl's Gestalt polarity theory and his Top Dog, Underdog
as a backdrop
These various theoretical constructs would serve

motivational forces
for the students 'own exploration of the hidden
actions.
that, to a large extent, influence their moral

Of particular
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value in this experiential segment would be the use of guided
fantasies, Gestalt "dream work", role-playing, art, and dance.

There are

a myriad such exercises described in books by Assagioli
(1971, 1974),

Sevens (1971), Hall (1976), Peris, Hefferline and Goodman (1951), and
others.
To achieve at least the beginning of

a

personal synthesis

between cognitive and affective influences on one's actions, students

would be encouraged to reflect (perhaps in

a

journal and/or by using

objective measures on themselves, such as Rest's Defining Issues Test ),
on how well they coordinate their cognitive conceptions and their

"gut reactions."

For example, they may discover that, though they

recognize and appreciate principled moral thinking, their emotional

reactions derive from

a

preconventional level.

moral choice, one may act out of fear (Stage

1)

When making

a

real

or for personal advan-

tage (Stage 2) even whilo recognizing the superiority of moral

reasoning at
person as

a

a

higher level.

hypocrite.

Nor does this necessarily brand such a

There may be powerful familial and environ-

mental structures reinforcing such patterns of behavior on an
habitual or pre-conscious level.

reasoning is one way (possibly
of changing moral behavior.

a

Appreciating higher levels of
necessary but not sufficient cause)

However,

a

direct analysis and confron-

tation with these habits themselves using, for example, Weinstein's

Trumpet or Assagioli'

s

stages of the will also seems necessary to

convert thought into reasonable and responsible action.
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5.

Super-Rational Value Sources ,

The infra-rational value

sources operate from below, # both in relation to the level of con-

sciousness and awareness and in regard to lower moral stages.

Super-

rational value sources exert their influence from above both in the
sense of furnishing motivation for moral action that logic cannot

provide and in the sense of emanating from a higher level of consciousness.

Some have celled this the realm of the transcendent or the

transpersonal.

Traditionally that terminology has been associated

with God, mysticism end prayer.

More recently psychologists such as

Maslow and Assagioli have used it in reference to the apex of the
human personality which exists in relationship to ultimate meaning
and Being.

As psychologists they have rightfully stopped short of

affirming the existence of or of attempting to define what sort of

Reality would satisfy this human aspiration for meaning and motivate
moral action.
This module would expose the aspiring teacher to some of the

work of transpersonal psychologists particularly as they refer to
motives for action.

As we saw in Chapter three, moral judgment like

but must
logic, cannot justify itself by its own rules of procedure

rather than logical
fall back on "first principles" which are intuitive

here as
*" Below" should not necessarily be understood

needs, e.g.,
"inferior" but rather as lower on Maslow' s hierarchy of
the rich
from
derived
as
or
goods necessary for self preservation,
development
moral
and
soil of the unconscious. Genuine personal
person, (that would
cannot mean transcending these foundations of the
rather synthesizing them.
be angelism rather than humanism), but
the rational and the
There will always be a polar tension between
but dialogue
infra-rational, nor is one reducible to the other,
entire person.
between the two cannot help enriching the
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(the medieval synderesis) and self- justifying.

experience, meaning and value coincide in

a

In the peak of mysticel

synoptic, intuitive grasp

of reality which may (or may not) become incarnated in

which the person organizes his or her life.
itual or meta-ethical values.

a

Way around

We have called these spir-

They carry with them religious (or semi-

religious) and moral overtones.

Students would familiarize themselves with the systems of such

men as James, Jung, Maslow, Neumann, and Assagioli.

Of particular

value because of their attempt to synthesize the goals of psychology,

education and various spiritual disciplines are the works of Naranjo
and Ornstein,

(Naranjo and Omstein, 1971, Naranjo, 1972, Orstein,

1972).
In keeping with the experiential orientation of the curriculum,

the learners would, in addition, participate in exercises designed to

activate their own intuitive facilities and to relate them to their

Way of life.

Again there are a multitude of techniques which could be

Among them are Benson’s relaxation response (1975),

employed.

Assagioli

1

s

techniques, the Arica
(1971), spiritual psycho-synthesis

more tradipsychocallisthenics and meditative exercises as well as
Sufism, etc. Brian
tional "religious” exercises derived from Zen

would be helpful here
Hall’s The Development of Consciousness (1975),
to synthesize spiritual
because it combines exercises which attempt

developmental orientation.
and moral values and because it has a

Conclusion .

expansion
This curriculum aims at a threefold

for the teacher-aspirants.

Hopefully they will have expanded their

of their own personalities
awareness of both the heights and depths
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by experiencing more of their subliminal or unconscious power and

motivation along with their teleological orientation toward
of meaning beyond their conscious selves.

a

source

Secondly their thinking will

have become more critical, self-aware and better able to deal with the

complexities and dilemmas of modern life.

Thirdly they would have

begun to integrate the thinking, feeling and acting facets of their

personalities and to experience themselves acting more as wholes than
as parts in opposition to each other.

This is the highest aim of

education and as teachers they can play an integral part in the

development of the human species.

APPENDIX
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The Effect of a Moral Development Workshop

Table 1:*

Mean percentage scores of DIT pre-test

data at each stage as used in initial chi-square
I

Stage

experimental

2

5B

5A

6

A

M

P

3

4

4.58

13.88

23.88

26.52

14.02

6.52

3.74

6.80

47.08

7.63

9.58

33.61

23.74

7.77

7.08

6.80

3.74

38.61

4.16

14.58

17.63

27.91

15.55

9.30

4.16

6.66

52.77

control

group one

control

group two

chi-square = 5*80 n.s.

* All data in this Appendix provided by Piwko (1974)
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The Effect of a Moral Development Workshop

Table 2:

Mean ”P" percentage scores and standard

deviations of pre and post-test DTT for all three groups

EXPERIMENTAL

CONTROL ONE

CONTROL TWO

PRE

POST

PRE

POST

PRE

POST

MEAN

44.72

52.77

45.55

47.08

39.44

38.61

SD

10.42

10.52

13.95

13.03

14.27

16.34
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Table 3:

Planned comparisons of pre

and post mean "P" percentage scores

Source

SS

df

MS

—

F

—

Between

1636.39

5

experimental pre vs post

381.19

1

381.19

control one pre vs post

4.05

1

4.05

.073

control two pre vs post

23.77

1

23.77

.429

exp and cont 1 vs cont 2

1168.07

1

1168.07

3.560

59.31

1

59.31

.309

1827.19

33

55.37

10832.98

33

328.27

residual

Error for repeated measures
Error for non-repeated
measures
.05

6.890*
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